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This thesis aims to elaborate on Soviet defensemaking with special attention to the 
process of evolution that characterized civil-military relations from Leonid I. 
Brezhnev and his successors up to Mikhail S. Gorbachev inclusive. It attempts an 
account of how the two parties perceived and responded to the external threats -in 
particular from the ‘West’ (the U.S. and NATO)- faced by the Union since the mid-
1960s and how the military endeavored to prevail in intrabureaucratic discussions in 
order to have a major say in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
SOVYET GÜVENLİK POLİTİKASI BAĞLAMINDA  
SİVİL-ASKER İLİŞKİLERİ:  
BREJNEV’DEN GORBAÇEV’E  
 
 
PAKİN, ESRA 
 
 
 
Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
 
Haziran 2003 
 
 
Bu tez Breznev’den Gorbaçev’e kadar geçen zaman içerisindeki Sovyet güvenlik 
politikasını irdelerken, sivil-asker ilişkilerindeki evrimsel sürece dikkat çekmektedir. 
Çalışma, her iki kesimin 1960’ların ortalarından başlayarak Sovyetler Birliği’ne 
yönelik, özellikle ‘Batı’dan (Amerika ve NATO) kaynaklanan dış tehditleri ne 
şekilde algıladığını ve bunlara karşı nasıl hareket ettiğini betimlemekte ve 
askeriyenin, Sovyet dış politikasının belirlenmesinde etkin söz sahibi olma 
girişimlerini aktarmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler:  Sovyet, Brejnev, Gorbaçev, sivil-asker, silah kontrolü, 
savunma 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
1.1. The aim of research 
In the present study, “civil-military relations” concern the exercise of 
influence on issues of mutual interest by the civilian and military leadership and 
display variation from country to country depending on the issues and their timing. 
The purpose of this research is to track the extent of military participation in the 
Soviet defensemaking process. It narrates the strains that the political leadership 
brought in the civil-military relations elaborating on the nature of agitation and 
adjustment during the period under review.  
 
1.2. The conceptual and methodological framework 
Written within the confines of historical-comparative research, this study is 
not exhaustive in its coverage of issues and personalities.1 While describing events 
                                                 
1 It is also beyond the scope of this research to analyze and/or criticize the existing models and 
theories on civil-military relations. However, brief information on the literature would suffice for the 
interested reader. 
Huntington draws a distinction between subjective and objective control as an underlying analytical 
framework. In the subjective control model, the civilian leadership seeks to maximize its power by 
establishing mechanisms of civilian control throughout the military. By contrast, in the objective 
control model, the civilian leadership endows the military with considerable autonomy in its missions, 
therefore avoids any interference by the officers in the sphere of politics. According to Huntington, 
subjective control was dominant in communist systems whereas the latter was more observable in 
democratic systems. For detailed information see Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). For a critique of this approach see David E. Albright, 
“A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 4, (July 
1980), pp. 553-576. 
Kolkowicz sees the Soviet defense making process as a zero-sum game between civilian and military 
elites. A conflict-prone relationship was perennial between the Communist Party and the Soviet 
military due to divergence in values, interests and styles. See Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military 
and the Communist Party, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). Later works of Kolkowicz 
point to a deviation from this argument and depict some degree of rapport between the civilian and 
military leadership. See especially Roman Kolkowicz, “Toward a Theory of Civil–Military Relations 
in Communist (Hegemonial) Systems,” in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrejz Korbonski, eds., Soldiers, 
Peasants and Bureaucrats, (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1982). 
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on a selective basis, it mainly seeks to provide a picture of the main decisionmakers 
and their role in framing and implementing policies. For the uninformed reader, 
detailed illustrations of the military and political infrastructure of the Soviet Union, 
can be found in the Appendices.2 
So as to make the work manageable and bring order to the inquiry, two 
interrelated factors among many were selected as indicators of leadership influence: 
arms control and resource allocation. Given the fact that these variables had 
considerable impact on the Soviet national security process, it was thought that this 
perspective would permit a more systematic narration in an in-depth manner. 
In approaching the case at hand, emphasis rests on individual actors. While 
bearing in mind that decisions are heavily influenced by the institutional framework 
                                                                                                                                          
William E. Odom observes convergence rather than conflict between the two entities. Despite 
occasional instances of opinion differences, consensus is considered to be a highly likely outcome. 
For more details see especially William E. Odom, “A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to 
Soviet Politics,” World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 4, (July 1976), pp. 542-567. 
Timothy J. Colton observes interaction between the two poles and highlights bargaining and political 
maneuvering among the parties while defense policies are formulated. For further elaboration see 
Timothy J. Colton, “Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union,” in Timothy J. 
Colton and Thane Gustafson, eds., Soldiers and the Soviet State, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990) and Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1979). 
Condoleezza Rice shares a similar approach in her study of civil-military relations in the Soviet 
Union. “Loose coupling,” a model derived from the organizational theory literature and first applied to 
the Soviet case by Rice, describes a hierarchical relationship between civil and military authority in 
which decisions are made by the former to be implemented by the latter. The arenas within which the 
military can wield influence are limited to matters of organization, strategy and force posture, whereas 
on the issues of threat assessment and calculation of social costs et cetera the civilian leadership 
assumes priority. “Loose coupling” refers to the lack of any serious threat by the military to the 
civilian rule. Nevertheless, in cases of any interference by the military in political matters, the civilian 
authority reserves the right to maintain the balance through removing the agitators from the decision 
making process. See Condoleezza Rice, “The Party, the Military and Decision Authority in the Soviet 
Union,” World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1, (October 1987), pp. 55-81. 
For a concise summary and analysis of these approaches see Amos Perlmutter and William M. 
LeoGrande, “ The Party in Uniform: Toward A Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist 
Political Systems,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, Issue 4, (December 1982), pp. 
778-789; John W. R. Lepingwell, “Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup,” World 
Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4, (July 1992), pp. 539-572 and Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 
1967-1989, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
2 Two other valuable sources complementary to the present study are Civil-Military Relations: A 
Dictionary (English-Russian), DCAF Document No. 2, (Geneva, March 2002). Available at 
http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/DCAF_Documents/e-r_dictionary.pdf and Russko-Angliiskii Voenno-
Politicheskii Slovar’, DKVS Dokument No. 2, (Geneva, March 2002). Available at 
http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/DCAF_Documents/r-e_dictionary.pdf. 
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within which they are formulated and put into practice, it is contended that 
individuals can play a substantial role in shaping the decisionmaking process. 
 Accordingly, “the top military leadership” in the Soviet Union will refer to 
the two most important decisionmakers in the Soviet Armed Forces: the defense 
minister and chief of the General Staff (who also served as the first deputy defense 
minister).3 Parenthetically, just because the top military officers advocate a certain 
set of policies it does not follow that the officers beneath them share their views. 
However, calculating the extent of support for the country’s top military officers 
within the military is problematic. The same concern is also valid for the civilian 
establishment, bearing in mind a vast conglomeration of people involving scientists, 
intellectuals, national elites in the republics and others, each with a different interest 
of their own.  
Therefore, the choice was made in favor of the defense minister and the chief 
of staff since they were the most influential in deciding the military’s interests and in 
overseeing the implementation of policies approved by the political leadership. 
Likewise, the “top civilian/political leadership” will refer to the principal 
decisionmaker in the Soviet political system: the general secretary.4 Documentation 
                                                 
3 I am indebted to Dale R. Herspring’s The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990) for inspiration. This work is the first in-depth analysis of the evolution of the 
Soviet high command (referring to the dominant group within the upper ranks of the professional 
officer corps) within the specified period. However, the present study takes its point of departure as 
1964, the very beginning of Brezhnev’s tenure and ends with the August coup of 1991 when 
Gorbachev resigned his post as general secretary. Accordingly, the defense ministers under scrutiny 
include, Rodion Ya. Malinovskii (1957-1967), Andrei A. Grechko (1967-1976), Dmitrii F. Ustinov 
(1976-1984), Sergei L. Sokolov (1984-1987) and Dmitrii T. Yazov (1987-1991). The chiefs of staff 
include Matvei V. Zakharov (1960-1963 and 1964-1971), Viktor G. Kulikov (1971-1977), Nikolai V. 
Ogarkov (1977-1984), Sergei F. Akhromeyev (1984-1988) and Mikhail A. Moiseyev (1988-1991).   
4 “General secretary” is the title of the head of the Communist Party Secretariat, who presides over the 
Politburo and has been the Soviet Union’s de facto supreme leader. Joseph V. Stalin became general 
secretary of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) in 1922. After Stalin’s death in 1953, the title 
was changed to first secretary, which was used by Nikita S. Khrushchev and Leonid I. Brezhnev until 
1966. At that date, the title of the general secretary was reinstituted. Brezhnev’s successors –Yuri V. 
Andropov, Konstantin U. Chernenko and Mikhail S. Gorbachev- were all general secretaries. 
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of conflict will be confined to differences of opinion between the party leader and his 
two military counterparts only.5  
 
1.3. Sources 
It is a well-acknowledged trait of Soviet politics that, suppressing information 
about differences of opinion and interest is an old tradition that obstructs availability 
of data about the personalities prevailed in controversies and content of the 
arguments. Therefore, the present author is handicapped from the beginning given 
the paucity of sources and studies on civil-military relations in the late-Soviet period. 
However, contributions by a variety of specialized Western publications are 
appreciated and given due credit since their findings are of analytic importance in 
their own right.6 
 This study’s treatment of Soviet defense relies heavily on secondary sources 
in English, written through a close reading of the leaderships’ key pronouncements, 
books and pamphlets and of articles which appeared in the most important Soviet 
political-military newspapers Pravda (daily newspaper published by the Central 
                                                 
5 It is of utmost importance not to refer to the armed forces, the security police and the defense 
industry in the same vein. Though the KGB (or Committee on State Security), like the military, 
controls armed units and key security resources the two have distinct missions, histories and skills. 
Likewise, the organizational structure and concerns of the defense industry do not match with those of 
the military. The members of the military-industrial sector are above all senior economic 
administrators and not military personnel dedicated to the development and manufacture of 
armaments. For detailed information see Amy Knight, “The KGB and Civil-Military Relations,” and 
Julian Cooper, “The Defense Industry and Civil-Military Relations,” in Timothy J. Colton and Thane 
Gustafson, eds., Soldiers and the Soviet State, (Princeton: Princeton University, 1990). An interesting 
article on the relationship between the armed forces and defense industry on designing the military-
technical policy is David Holloway, “Technology and Political Decision in Soviet Armaments 
Policy,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 11, Issue 4, (1974), pp. 257-279. 
6 As a reply to the suggestion that most of what was written on the Soviet state was meant primarily to 
mislead foreign readers, James McConnell argues that, despite “misleading statements and guarded 
language…the substance of the message [was] not affected [for] the Kremlin [could] not afford to 
deceive its own cadres.” Put in other words, the author believes there was little disinformation in the 
Soviet press. For an extensive discussion see James McConnell, “Shifts in Soviet Views on the Proper 
Focus of Military Development,” World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 3, (April 1985), pp. 317-347. The 
reliability of data, particularly on the size of military budget is another problematique. One 
explanation of the valuation of the GNP and military expenditure of the Soviet Union see The Military 
Balance 1970-1971 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), pp. 10-12. 
 4 
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Izvestiia (daily newspaper 
published by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union) and 
Krasnaya zvezda (daily newspaper published by the Ministry of Defense) and 
journals Kommunist (the leading theoretical and political journal of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party), Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil (the leading 
journal of the Main Political Administration of the Army and Fleet) and Voenno-
istoricheskii zhurnal (the journal of the Ministry of Defense).7 The author also made 
use of a number of Russian sources on hand as well as translating them into English. 
     
1.4. Synopsis8 
1.4.1. The Brezhnev era (1964-1982) 
The so-called “golden age” in the realm of Soviet civil-military relations 
began with Leonid I. Brezhnev’s accession to the post of general secretary. 
Cordiality became the watchword that characterized civil-military interactions until 
the early 1970s. Within the subject period, setting up a strong defense against 
external threats was the common denominator under which civilian and military 
elites united. Brezhnev called for intensive and disciplined work to strengthen the 
Soviet armed forces. Moreover, the presence of the military was institutionalized in 
the Politburo through which the uniformed officers obtained a direct voice in 
policymaking. 
From 1970 on, the “golden age” was drawing to a close. Now that the Soviet 
Union achieved strategic parity with the U.S., and that the fallacy behind the idea of 
                                                 
7 In general, articles by the defense minister appeared in Pravda. However, the defense minister would 
also publish articles in other two newspapers. Among the journals, Kommunist tended to contain the 
most significant articles. Usually, one Kommunist article per year, mostly in February or March was 
devoted to military affairs and was authored by the defense minister or chief of staff on key issues 
regarding the Soviet Armed Forces. 
8 A valuable source in Russian, though mainly concerns the Russian Federation, allocates a few pages 
summarizing the civil-military relations in the Soviet Union. See Aleksandr Vladimirov, Voennaya 
Reforma v Rossii, (Moscow: Yukea, 2000), pp. 170-173. 
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the winnability of a nuclear war seemed to have been acknowledged by the two 
superpowers, the civilian leadership considered it best to divert attention to the 
debilitating problem of consumer expectations. In consequence, Brezhnev publicly 
declared that he was prepared to redefine defense policy priorities at the expense of 
military’s interests. The military leadership, who were constantly warning against 
imperialist designs aimed at the collapse of communism, did not hesitate to articulate 
their indictment of “Brezhnevism,” that was gradually turning into a personality cult. 
Patronage politics marked the day, by means of which people with non-militaristic 
views were chosen for defense agenda-setting and policy formulation. His tenure 
ended, leaving behind a number of arms limitation treaties, yet an ailing economy 
and a corrupt bureaucracy. 
 
1.4.2. The Andropov-Chernenko interregnum (1982-1984/1984-1985) 
The “interregnum” following Brezhnev’s death saw the brief secrataryships 
of Yuri V. Andropov and Konstantin U. Chernenko which lasted fifteen and thirteen 
months respectively. Both adhered to the belief that détente was a long-term trend 
and zealously embarked on imposing further cuts on the defense budget. 
 Initially, Andropov adopted a propitiating stance toward the military. Later 
on, to the disappointment of the high command, he assigned priority to anti-
corruption campaigns and the development of consumer goods production. Though 
the military leadership seemed content with the extensive upgrading of Soviet forces, 
their resentment against the decade-long freeze on expenditures for procurement had 
long reached its peak. In consequence, Andropov, interpreting military’s 
assertiveness as encroachment over the civilian leadership’s prerogatives, buttressed 
 6 
the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the realm of defense policy 
making. 
Chernenko proved to be the least concerned about the imperialist threat, 
accentuating diplomatic negotiation and a more peaceful international posture.  
Following his predecessors, Chernenko corroborated the importance of military 
spending at the outset of his tenure. Nevertheless, he demoted the issue to second 
place since consumer satisfaction soon ranked top on his security agenda. 
 
1.4.3. The Gorbachev era (1985-1991) 
Soviet security policy since 1985 was mainly designed at the hands of 
civilian authorities favoring the liberal approach. Accordingly, the Gorbachev period 
witnessed painful reductions in national sources allotted to defense, cancellation of 
major weapons programs and increased diversion of military industrial capacity to 
civil production. To make matters worse, for the first time in history, the military had 
to endure close public scrutiny of its portrayal of threats, its resource demands and its 
activities. In general, the military consented to Gorbachev’s arms control policy, 
albeit unwillingly. Their reservations stemmed from such aspects as unilateral cuts 
on a massive level and intrusive verification measures.  
Increased control over the military establishment by both the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and a reinvigorated Parliament added insult to injury. Deprived of 
the earlier autonomy rendering them vocal in defensemaking, the military was almost 
forced to recognize civilian authority. This stance signified the first serious fissures 
in civil-military relations leading to heightened tension in winter 1990-1991 and 
early spring 1991. Being ardent followers of the socialist cause, the military 
leadership denounced democratic initiatives as these attempted to change the existing 
 7 
political structure. The crisis eventually culminated into the abortive August 1991 
coup, regarded as a turning point in the development of Soviet civil-military relations 
since it pointed to the military’s first, yet polemical, intervention in Soviet politics. 
Instigated by the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs together with 
conservative groups within the Communist Party, the coup was supported only half-
heartedly by the military displaying the latter’s loyalty to civilian authority.  
Nevertheless, the incident paved the way for the formulation and implementation of 
new military reforms. Unfortunately, the proclamation of the "Commonwealth of 
Independent States" in December 1991 would halt the attempt to more concretely 
bind the armed forces to the Soviet state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
CHAPTER II 
THE BREZHNEV ERA (1964-1982) 
 
 
2.1. The “Golden Age” of civil-military relations 
Upon Brezhnev’s elevation to the post of general secretary, the high 
command had every reason to hope that his advent would lead to a substantial 
improvement in civil-military relations.9 Still in the process of consolidating his 
personal power, Brezhnev seemed congenial to military interests as could be 
observed in his oft-pronounced commitment to a massive conventional and nuclear 
buildup in armed forces. Just at the outset of his tenure, Brezhnev gave public 
reassurances to “strengthen the country’s defense stability.”10  Remarking that past 
experience taught vigilance to bolster peace, he displayed the willingness with which 
he would pursue an all-service buildup.11 While favoring an expanded military 
budget, Brezhnev was also a proponent of giving due credit to military’s preferences 
and priorities on concept and program formulation out of respect for the institution’s 
status and freedom of action. 
The Party leader’s receptivity to military participation in security policy 
making appealed to the high command who believed that a major expansion of the 
military establishment was crucial to deter foreign attack and put the Soviet Union on 
                                                 
9 For a detailed examination of the military trends of the Khrushchev period see Thomas W. Wolfe, 
Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). For a discussion of 
the factors that led to Khrushchev’s deposition see Abraham Brumberg, “The Fall of Khrushchev-
Causes and Repercussions,” in John W. Strong, The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin, (New 
York: D.Van Nostrand Company, 1971), pp. 1-15 and William J. Tompson, “The Fall of Nikita 
Khrushchev,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 43, No. 6, (1991), pp. 1101-1121. 
10 Pravda, December 10, 1964, quoted in Thomas W. Wolfe, “Problems of Defense Policy Under the 
New Regime,” Slavic Review, Vol. 24, Issue 2, (June 1965), p. 176. 
11 L. I. Brezhnev, Leninskim Kursom, Vol. 1, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1973-1982), p. 160-162 quoted in 
Bruce Parrott, “Political Change and Civil-Military Relations,” in Timothy Colton and Thane 
Gustafson eds., Soldiers and the Soviet State, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 47. 
 9 
par with the U.S. regarding strategic and conventional capabilities. The Defense 
Minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovskii, and the Chief of Staff, Marshal Matvei 
Zakharov who had long inveighed against “subjective” formulation of defense policy 
associated with the civilian leadership in the Khrushchev era, articulated repetitively 
their praise for Brezhnev’s paying greater heed to professional military advice. 
According to Zakharov, the high command’s aspirations for all-around bolstering of 
the Soviet military posture were finally to be realized.12 Malinovskii’s report at the 
23rd Party Congress13 in April 1966 acclaimed the “special importance” attached to 
developing mobile land-based missiles for further diversification of the Soviet 
strategic potential.14  
 
2.2. First signs of discord on arms control 
After Malinovskii’s death in the spring of 1967, the appointment of Marshal 
Andrei Grechko as his successor flattered the army’s pride while heralding a more 
energetic officer to the post. Nevertheless, the changeover would soon cause the first 
clouds to appear on the horizon since the new Defense Minister disfavored any 
consideration of the recent U.S. attempts to enter into strategic arms negotiations. 
                                                 
12 Thomas W. Wolfe, “Problems of Defense Policy Under the New Regime,” pp. 178-180, also see 
Krasnaya zvezda, February 4, 1965 quoted in Robin Edmonds, Soviet Policy: The Brezhnev Years, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). p. 38 and M. V. Zakharov, “Imperative Demand of Our 
Times,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp. 13-15 quoted in Dan L. Strode and 
Rebecca Strode, “Diplomacy and Defense in Soviet National Security Policy,” International Security, 
Vol. 8, No. 2, (Fall 1983), p. 113. 
13 The party congress was defined as the “supreme organ” of the CPSU. In effect, it was less than a 
“supreme organ” in practice. The large number of delegates and the relative infrequency of the 
congresses made this body subsidiary to the Central Committee (q.v.) and the Politburo (q.v.). Since 
the mid-1950s, congresses were to be held every five years. It normally met for about a week. The 
most important event occurred when the general secretary delivered the political report on the state of 
the party, reviewed Soviet economic and foreign policy over the preceding five years, cited 
achievements and problems of the world communist movement, and delivered a prospectus for the 
next five years. In another important speech, the chairman of the Council of Ministers presented the 
targets for the next five-year plan. Next, shorter speeches followed. While in session, the party 
congress voted on several kinds of issues. All decisions were unanimous. Most significantly, the party 
congress formally elected the members of the Central Committee, which it charged to govern the party 
for the next five years.  
14 Krasnaya zvezda, April 2, 1966 quoted in Thomas W. Wolfe, “Evolution of Soviet Military Policy,” 
in John W. Strong, ed., The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin, p. 79. 
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Unlike Malinovskii and Zakharov, who mostly concentrated their interests on 
personnel-related problems and saw no reason for meddling into political issues such 
as arms control and the budget (since their demands were being met at the time), 
Grechko soon proved to be unyielding in his views. His concern stemmed from the 
possibility that, endorsement by the Brezhnev leadership of arms control agreements 
would eventuate in cutbacks in the military budget.15 
The signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NBT) in August 1963 -
brought into force in 1970- had been the first step in arms limitation, prohibiting 
nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. To the dislike of 
Grechko, morever, President Lyndon Johnson of the United States had no intention 
to give up rallying the governments of the two superpowers round the cause of what 
came to be known as SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) talks16. Grechko’s 
mistrust of the SALT process would not help block its initiation despite his diligent 
pursuit of a campaign designed, at least, to delay the negotiations.17 In February 
1968, he delivered an admonitory speech claiming that “American imperialism” 
constituted the major source of “war and aggression” and called for increased 
watchfulness in dealing with the U.S.18  
On 1 July 1968, however, the three signatories to the earlier NBT, namely, 
Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States concluded the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accordingly, each signatory (43 countries on 
the whole) undertook not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over such weapons 
to any recipient and not to assist in or encourage their manufacturing. The 
                                                 
15 This paragraph is based upon Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, pp. 51-75 
and Bruce Parrott, “Political Change and Civil-Military Relations”, pp. 44-49. 
16 A strategic weapon is one that can deliver a nuclear warhead to the territory of the enemy. 
17 Robin Edmonds, Soviet Policy: The Brezhnev Years, pp. 74-76. For an account of the opening of the 
talks and the proceedings see Sidney I. Ploss, “Soviet Politics on the Eve of the 24th Party Congress,” 
World Politics, Vol. 23, Issue 1, (October 1970), pp. 61-82. 
18 Pravda, February 24, 1968 quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, p. 
75. 
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participants also agreed on accepting certain provisions designed to prevent abusive 
usage of nuclear energy. Unconvinced, Grechko continued his assault on the U.S., 
asserting that it should admit its liabilities regarding the “military provocation and 
adventures” pursued in other countries. As he claimed, much remained to be done in 
the sphere of Soviet military modernization despite impressive gains the armed 
forces had made by that time. Despite his efforts, the two superpowers initiated the 
SALT talks in Helsinki in November 1969. By the time the negotiators began 
deliberations, the Soviet Union had nearly closed the gap with the U.S. on 
quantitative terms. From Brezhnev’s standpoint, the SALT process was a chance to i)  
reach strategic parity with the U.S., ii) add momentum to the policy of deténte with 
the U.S., iii) reap long-term economic benefits through opening of western markets, 
iv) preclude a possible Sino-American rapprochement.19 
Grechko, who believed that the Soviet security policy had traditionally been a 
matter for the high command, was determined to protect the military’s prerogative in 
its formulation. Though the General Staff20 was a direct participant in the SALT 
process, being the exclusive authority in providing the necessary military-technical 
                                                 
19Robin Edmonds, Soviet Policy: The Brezhnev Years; Kommunist, No. 3, (February 1969), p. 21 
quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, p. 76; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 
Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, 4th edition, (New York: Harper and 
Collins Publishers Inc., 1992), pp. 239-240. Beginning in the second half of the 1960s up to early 
1970s the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal not only witnessed a substantial numerical expansion, but 
also saw the introduction and application of such advanced technologies as multiple independently-
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), mobile missile launchers and sophisticated stellar-navigational 
systems. The Soviets procured hundreds of second- and third-generation long-range missile systems 
powered by storable liquid fuel, which guaranteed a higher degree of readiness. They also built 
ballistic missile submarines to be utilized as launch platforms for nuclear weapons. Warhead 
production, command-and-control arrangements and early warning systems were also upgraded. See 
Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993).  
20 The Ministry of Defense was the primary government agency responsible for the implementation of 
CPSU military policy. Although technically the Ministry was a government agency, it stood apart 
from other ministries by virtue of the fact that it was dominated by the military. The General Staff was 
the main planning and executive organ of the Ministry of Defense, manned entirely by officers. It 
performed strategic and operational research and planning, provided strategic military intelligence and 
analysis to the Defense Council (q.v.), dealt with foreign military attachés and gave occasional press 
briefings on political-military issues. See Appendix B. 
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data to conduct negotiations, Grechko made every personal effort to discredit civilian 
views and minimize losses on the Soviet side.21 
 
2.3. Brezhnev holds onto power: the beginning of a personality cult     
Grechko and Brezhnev converged on the point that a strong military was an 
inseparable element of the Soviet superpower status. Yet, the key bone of contention 
was that, while the Defense Minister was against curbing the military budget since 
this would lead to technical inferiority, the General Secretary advocated the idea that 
further involvement of scientists in the nonmilitary sector would contribute to the 
benefit of the overall economy which, in turn, would result in a higher rate of 
military investment. The problem was not one of divergence over the goal of 
bolstering Soviet security but over the means by which this goal could be 
accomplished.22  
 The underlying motive of Brezhnev’s rapprochement with America was the 
need to sacrifice long-term growth in heavy-industrial capacity to the short-term 
requirements of agriculture and light industry in the hope of meeting consumer 
demands. Accordingly, if military tensions were eased, then the money saved could 
be directed to the cause of consumer satisfaction. The Party leader, having seen the 
bitter ramifications of an increased military budget, took a firm decision to allocate 
more resources to civilian production especially in the domain of agriculture. When, 
in the early 1970s, the economy was further beset by adverse weather conditions, a 
falling demographic curve and the added costs involved in the extraction of 
                                                 
21 Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, p. 77.   
22 Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, p. 103. 
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inaccessible raw materials (oil in particular), Brezhnev hastened to seize the reins in 
the realm of policymaking.23 
 In fact, he had already embarked on this project as early as December 1969 
when, at the Plenum of the Central Committee24, he expanded his stature in the 
industrial-administrative decisionmaking. It was also him, not the Chairman Alexei 
Kosygin that delivered the main speech to the Council of Ministers25 in June 1970. 
Later the same year, Brezhnev alone signed the directives of the Ninth Five-Year 
Plan (1971-1975). These were also the years when he began to take the initiative in 
foreign affairs, finally assuming in 1971, personal direction of Soviet-American 
relations. In accord with these, Brezhnev threw his full weight to the solution of the 
agricultural problem. At the July 1970 Plenum, funds allocated to agricultural 
development were increased by 70 percent. Additionally, a major new program was 
launched in January 1971 for the industrialization of animal husbandry. A climactic 
                                                 
23 Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, pp. 78-79, 102-103. Brezhnev regarded 
agriculture as “an extensive, vitally important branch of the national economy” and “ a great political 
task of the whole Party and the whole state.” See L. I. Brezhnev, “On Progress in Implementing the 
Decisions of the 23rd Congress and the Plenary Meeting of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
on Problems of Agriculture,” October 30, 1968 in L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin’s Course, trans. Y. 
Davydov, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), pp. 103, 117. See Appendix A for numerical data on 
Soviet economic growth.  Also see Peter Rutland, “ Economic Management and Reform” in Stephen 
White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman, eds., Developments in Soviet Politics, (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1990), p. 161. 
24 The Central Committee met at least once every six months in plenary session. Between party 
congresses, the Central Committee was required to direct all activities of the party and the local party 
organs, carry out the recruitment and the assignment of leading cadres, direct the work of the central 
governmental and social organization of the workers, create various organs, institutions and 
enterprises of the party and supervise their activities, name the editorial staff of central newspapers 
and journals working under its auspices, disburse funds of the party budget and verify their 
accounting. See Appendix B. 
25 The highest executive and administrative body of the Soviet Union. Its chairman was called 
‘premier’ in Western parlance. It directed most day-to-day state activities. Among the formal powers 
of the Council of Ministers in the realm of foreign affairs were the prerogatives to grant and withdraw 
recognition of foreign states, to establish or break diplomatic relations, to order acts of reprisal, to 
appoint negotiators and supervise the conduct of negotiations, to conclude “executive arrangements” 
not requiring executive ratification, and to appoint, supervise and direct Soviet diplomatic 
representatives abroad. Real authority rests with the Presidium, a smaller working group of senior 
officials. See Appendix B.  
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decision came in April 1971 when targets and funds for agricultural complexes were 
announced to be doubled.26  
 As Brezhnev declared at the 24th Party Congress, in accord with his “Peace 
Program,” consumer industries (or Group B industries in Soviet parlance) would be 
given priority over Group A industries, namely the heavy and defense industries. The 
Party leader’s propounded explanation was that, although imperialism was 
“reactionary and aggressive,” an improvement in relations between the Soviet Union 
and the U.S. was possible since Soviet policy was based on the principles “of 
peaceful existence, of developing mutually advantageous ties and of cooperating 
with all states ready to do so in strengthening peace and making relations with them 
as stable as possible.”27 This move was a complete reversal of the policy choice 
Brezhnev articulated in a speech in February 1968 that underscored “ the accelerated 
development of heavy industry as the basis of  [Soviet] industrial might.”28 
 Though the final resolution of the Congress ensured that “the strengthening of 
the might and preparedness of the Soviet armed forces [would] remain at the center 
of the Party attention,” -a decision taken presumably on account of another potential 
threat at that moment from China, which was conducting hostile propaganda against 
the Soviets and making territorial claims on the Soviet state- it failed to assuage the 
                                                 
26 Bruce Parrott, “Political Change and Civil-Military Relations”, pp. 52-52, 247; George W. 
Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Politics, (London: George 
Allen and Unwin Publications, Ltd., 1982), p. 194. For more on how Brezhnev strengthened his 
position through the easing out of hostile incumbents and the promotion of reliable subordinates see 
John P. Willerton, Jr., “Patronage Networks and Coalition Building in the Brezhnev Era,” Soviet 
Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2, (April 1987), pp. 175-204. 
27 L. I. Brezhnev, “Report of the CPSU Central Committee of the 24th Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union,” 30 March 1971 quoted in Janis Sapiets, “The 24th Congress of the Soviet 
Communist Party,” Russian Review, Vol. 31, Issue 1, (January 1972), pp. 15-19. 
28 Brezhnev’s speech in Leningrad on February 16, 1968, recorded by Western monitors of Soviet 
broadcasts quoted in Sidney I. Ploss, “Soviet Politics on the Eve of 24th Party Congress,” World 
Politics, Vol. 23, Issue 1, (October 1970), p. 64. 
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military’s surmounting worries over the direction in which the civilian leadership 
was taking the country.29 
 
2.4. The military strikes back 
 For its part, the military had no intention to admit defeat in this protracted 
struggle over who would prevail in defense policymaking. Zakharov sided with 
Grechko in an article he wrote shortly before leaving the post as chief of staff. There 
he accentuated his observations on a continued arms race driven by a “bloc” of 
imperialists.30 Soon Grechko followed, warning against “the danger of a new war.”31  
Grechko’s vociferous criticism against the SALT package reached its peak in 
1972 when he denounced the U.S. for “breaking the norms of international law and 
complicating the international situation.”32 The Defense Minister was not alone in his 
remonstration against U.S. aggression. Viktor Kulikov, who had replaced Zakharov 
in 1971, soon proved to be more outspoken on political issues than his predecessor. 
While commenting upon deténte Kulikov often reiterated the military nature of 
imperialism and mostly spoke negatively on the SALT negotiations.33  
 Nevertheless, the clash of interests did not precipitate a serious rupture in 
civil-military relations. Grechko gave the initial signs of a lukewarm support of the 
civilian stance on arms control. Yet, he did not refrain from labeling imperialism as 
“malicious and perfidious […] ready to commit any crime for the sake of its 
                                                 
29 Janis Sapiets, “The 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party”, pp. 14-20. 
30 Izvestiia, June 22, 1971 quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, p.107. 
31 A. Grechko, On Guard for Peace and the Building of Communism, trans. Joint Publications 
Research Service, 54602, December 2, 1971 of the original Russian Na strazhe mira: stroitel’stva 
Kommunizma (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1971) quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet 
High Command: 1967-1989, p. 107. 
32 Pravda, February 23, 1972 quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, p. 
108. 
33 Izvestiia, February 23, 1972 quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, 
p. 108. 
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mercenary interests.”34 Under the constraints of the party discipline and upon 
consideration that close contact with the West would at least provide easy access to 
modern technology to upgrade Soviet armed forces, Grechko thought it tenable to 
make some concessions.35 
 A remarkable event in spring 1972 raised hopes about enhanced political 
collaboration between the civilian and military leadership. As the date was nearing 
the completion of SALT I negotiations, Brezhnev, accompanied by Grechko, 
conveyed an address at a meeting of the high command offering justifications for his 
security policy.36 In return, the gesture was highly praised by the defense minister.37 
As a result, conditioning their support for the SALT I on continued strengthening of 
the armed forces, Grechko and Kulikov fully endorsed the accords. 
 According to SALT I, the two strategic arms agreements concluded in May 
1972 were the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) and 
the Interim Agreement (to last five years) on certain measures with respect to the 
limitation of strategic offensive arms. Overall, the provisions of the SALT accords 
which prescribed the number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers 
and missiles aboard nuclear submarines granted the Soviets numerical superiority 
over the U.S. Yet, the Soviets were deprived of the single most promising technology 
(ABM-related technologies) for alleviating the destructive consequences in case of a 
nuclear war. To the further disadvantage of the Soviets, American superiority over 
strategic bombers and Forward-Based Systems (FBS-the French and British nuclear 
delivery systems and the U.S. land- and carrier-based nuclear weapons in Europe) 
                                                 
34 Kommunist, No. 4, (March 1971) quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-
1989, pp. 107-109. 
35 Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, p. 114; Bruce Parrott, “Political Change 
and Civil-Military Relations”, pp. 52-53. 
36Pravda, April 26, 1972 quoted in Bruce Parrott, “Political Change and Civil-Military Relations”, p. 
53. 
37 Pravda, May 9, 1972 quoted in Bruce Parrott, “Political Change and Civil-Military Relations”, p. 
53. 
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persisted since these issues were not covered during the SALT process. On the issue 
of control, “national technical means of verification” was specified meaning, in 
essence, satellite observation, which obviated the need for inspectors on subject 
territories.38 
 Nonetheless, the conclusion of negotiations worked against the expectations 
for a long-term amity in civil-military relations. The aftermath of the SALT process 
indicated a period of fluctuations on the military’s part regarding the assessment of 
the international arena. In a concerted effort with the new chief of staff, Grechko 
began to pronounce more acrimonious statements about the accords, demonstrating 
his suspicion of the reliability of treaties “to eliminate the danger of nuclear war.”39 
The Defense Minister’s view was countered by Brezhnev who expressed his trust for 
the treaties, claiming that peaceful coexistence was the foundation upon which 
bilateral relations rested in a nuclear age.40 Grechko did not hesitate to continue his 
assault on the U.S. charging the country with an enthusiasm to break the détente and 
return to the “time of the cold war.”41 
 During a national conference of military party secretaries in March 1973, 
when Brezhnev reaffirmed the Party’s “sacred obligation” to guarantee the 
comprehensive upgrading of the armed forces, the Defense Minister seemed to tone 
down the criticism in his speech, praising the effective handling of military 
                                                 
38 Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution, pp. 24-25; Robin Edmonds, Soviet Policy: The Brezhnev 
Years, pp. 107-111; Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 131-135; Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet 
Foreign Policy Since World War II, 3rd edition, (New York: Pergamon Press, Inc., 1988), pp. 280-283; 
Richard F. Staar, Foreign Policies of the Soviet Union, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), pp. 
291-292. Another important bilateral agreement concluded in 1972 was the three-year grain 
agreement aimed at a long-term economic relationship between the two powers. Accordingly, the 
Soviets were to buy U.S. grown food grains and could pay them in credit.  
39 Pravda, September 30, 1972 quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, 
p. 109. 
40 L. I. Brezhnev, “Concerning the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”, in 
L. I. Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom, Vol. 4, (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1970), p. 79. 
41 Pravda, February 23, 1973 quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, p. 
109.  
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reconstruction “by the Politburo42 headed by comrade L. Brezhnev.” By this means, 
the military obtained greater leverage in the highest decisionmaking body over 
security policy.43 On several occasions in May, Grechko projected an affirmative 
stance regarding détente while, between the lines, he touched upon the continuing 
existence of “reaction and militarism.”44 
To the disappointment of the civilian leadership, however, Kulikov resumed 
from where Grechko left off. With a hard-nosed approach he frontally rebuked 
imperialism, showing his distrust against aggressive militancy targeted at curbing the 
power of the socialist states, above all, the Soviet Union.45 Grechko soon followed, 
hardening his position to accuse the forces of imperialism since “despite some 
relaxation in international relations,” the specter of war persisted.46  
 
2.5. Civilian supremacy reinstated 
Against this backdrop, a campaign was launched around 1974 under the 
auspices of the Main Political Administration (MPA)47, the principal agency charged 
with indoctrination of the military cadres. In an attempt to silence the opposition, the 
initial step taken was the dismissal of personnel sympathizing with military views. 
                                                 
42 The Politburo was the central decisionmaking agency concerned with all areas of national 
importance. It ultimately controlled defense policy, took the major resource allocation decisions, 
approved budgets and was the final arbiter of any controversies that arose. See Appendix B.  
43 This passage is based upon Bruce Parrott, “Political Change and Civil-Military Relations”, p. 54; F. 
Stephen Larrabee, “Gorbachev and the Soviet Military,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 5, (Summer 
1988), p. 1003 and Jeremy Azrael, The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command: 
1976-1986, RAND Report R-3521-AF, (June 1987) in Alexander Dallin ed., Russian and Soviet 
History: 1500-1991, Vol. 12, (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992), p. 166.  
44 Kommunist, No. 7, (May 1973) quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-
1989, p. 109. 
45 Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 6, (1973) quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High 
Command: 1967-1989, p. 109. 
46 Pravda, October 8, 1973 quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, p. 
111. 
47 MPA was an organ of the CPSU in the Ministry of Defense and was responsible for conducting 
ideological indoctrination and propaganda activities to prepare the armed forces for their role in 
national security. See Appendix B. 
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Next, a new program was designed to help the officers grasp “the major positive 
changes” resulting from détente.48  
 The military’s deepest fears were finally realized in April 1974, when some 
35 million rubles were allotted for the purposes of land reclamation and social 
development in the Non-Black-Earth Zone.49 In order to supply sources for these 
programs, investments in the domains of light and heavy industry were reduced. 
Moreover, the Soviet government sharply augmented imports of consumer goods, 
feed-grains and food.50 Brezhnev would make his point clearer in July when he 
remarked that “in recent years a quantity of weapons [had] already been amassed 
sufficient to destroy everything living on earth several times,” underlying the new 
emphasis on serving humanity by drawing more attention to basic needs.51 
 Upon these challenges, Grechko cried out for preparedness in case 
imperialism, “insistently perfecting its gigantic military machine,” would strike 
unannounced.52 As he repetitively underlined, the economic and military might of the 
Soviet Union carried utmost importance in restraining imperialist forces.53 For him, 
the view that the growth of Soviet military power could be slowed down without 
undermining détente was based on total fallacy.  
The signing of Vladivostok Accords in November 1974 -the penultimate step 
toward SALT II- was no less than a slap at the military. According to the provisions, 
                                                 
48 Bruce Parrott, “Political Change and Civil-Military Relations”, pp. 58-59. 
49 Investment in irrigation and land improvement in the non-black-earth regions of the Soviet Union 
increased from 5.8 billion rubles (1983 prices) to 8.1 billion between 1975-1984. Nevertheless, the 
initiative proved to be a costly failure. See Karl-Eugen Wadekin, “Agriculture” in Martin McCauley, 
ed., The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev, (London: MacMillan Press, 1990), p. 125. 
50 George W. Breslauer, Khruschev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Politics, p. 250. 
51 Pravda, July 22, 1974 quoted in Thomas N. Bjorkman and Thomas J. Zamostny, “Soviet Politics 
and Strategy Towards the West: Three Cases,” World Politics, (January 1984), p. 202. 
52 Krasnaya zvezda, June 5, 1974 in Timothy J. Colton, “Civil-Military Relations in Soviet Politics,” 
Current History, Vol. 67, (October 1974), p. 163, also see A. Grechko, Vooruzhennye sily Sovetskogo 
gosudarstva, (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1974) quoted in Bruce Parrott, “Political Change and Civil-
Military Relations”, pp. 56-57. 
53 “Grechko Addresses Kerch Meeting,” Kiev domestic service in Russian, September 14, 1974 
quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, p. 105.  
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the Soviets made major concessions in agreeing to equal levels of strategic forces. 
Each party was to limit its strategic missile delivery vehicles (land, sea and air-
based) to 2,400. Of these, a maximum of 1,320 could be equipped with multiple 
independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). This meant considerable 
advantage to the U.S. since at that time the U.S. had about 850 MIRV-equipped 
missiles, (that is, capable of carrying more than one nuclear warhead) whereas the 
Soviet Union had none that was operational. Moreover, as in SALT I, both the FBS 
and the nuclear forces of the U.S. allies were again excluded from the provisions. 
Yet, the signatories were authorized to pursue the strategic nuclear developments that 
were already under way, albeit subject to numerical limitations. To the benefit of the 
military, however, these provisions were never ratified.54 
Not surprisingly, Grechko rebuked the civilian leadership for underestimating 
the secrecy and haste with which the imperialist states pursued their military 
preparations.55 The attempt deteriorated the already-tense relations between the 
General Secretary and his military counterparts. Denying Grechko the opportunity to 
address the 25th Congress in February-March 1976, Brezhnev proclaimed the 
triumph of détente and affirmed his intention to search for arms control agreements. 
Although he pledged that the Party would seek to shore up the defense budget, his 
success in getting defense industries to play a greater role in the production of 
consumer goods was noteworthy. In the eyes of Brezhnev, now that the Soviet Union 
                                                 
54 Robin Edmonds, Soviet Policy: The Brezhnev Years, p.146; Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo 
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achieved strategic equivalence with the U.S., it could reduce the rate of military 
buildup.56  
Grechko died the next month, leaving the post to Dmitrii Ustinov, a civilian 
with antimilitaristic views and a longtime ally of the Party leader. He had already 
been promoted from candidate to full membership of the Politburo at the 25th Party 
Congress. The choice was interpreted by the high command as a further check on 
military interests. Nonetheless, Kulikov, undeterred, would continue to caution 
against overconfidence in détente when he drew attention to the enormous sums the 
U.S. was spending on its military.57  
 Brezhnev reached the apogee of his political career in 1976 and 1977. On 
May 9, he was appointed Marshal of the Soviet Union. This was the same date when 
Brezhnev’s chairmanship of the civilian-dominated Defense Council was 
publicized.58 He oversaw the construction of a new constitution in 1977, the clauses 
of which would enable him to remove Nikolai Podgorny as State President59 and 
combine the posts of head of state and Party General Secretary.  Kulikov’s transfer to 
the post of commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces in January 1977 further 
strengthened his stature. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, who had been one of the two 
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called the ‘president.’ The administrative organs of the Soviet state were responsible to the Supreme 
Soviet. See Appendix B. 
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senior representatives at the SALT I talks and displayed a visible sympathy towards 
Brezhnev’s views was concurrently appointed to the vacant position.60 
Ogarkov, despite his statements on the need for further improvements in 
Soviet defenses, was sanguine about the prospects of détente. Shortly after taking 
over as chief of staff, he had referred to the mid-1970s as showing signs of a 
relaxation in international tensions. Appraising the arms control process, Ogarkov 
pointed to the disappearance of “the danger of a new world war.”61 
Now that civilian supremacy over the military was established, Brezhnev 
imposed further budgetary restraint toward defense expenditures. The growth of 
defense spending was trimmed from an estimated 4-5 percent per year down to about 
2 percent. This trend would continue until the early 1980s with almost no increases 
in spending on military hardware. Nevertheless, since defense spending continued to 
account for 13-15 percent of the country’s GNP, there was every indication that the 
military establishment enjoyed not a small ration. Moreover, the military growth 
slowdown did not affect all Soviet weapons programs. Rather, in 1976-77, the 
deployment of the intermediate-range SS-20 missiles and others on account of 
intense lobbying by the high command would result in a serious deterioration of 
détente.62 
A remarkable event took place on January 18, 1977, in Tula when the civilian 
leadership avowed that no party could achieve “superiority” through “first-strike” 
                                                 
60 Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, p. 121; Ian Derbyshire, The Politics in 
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61 Sovietskaia Rossia, February 23, 1977 quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 
1967-1989, pp. 160-161. 
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capability.63 In his proclamation, Brezhnev accentuated a new orientation towards 
“defensive sufficiency,” calling for incremental strategic reductions. The option of 
being the first to launch a nuclear attack was also discarded. Parenthetically, what 
Brezhnev meant by the so-called “Tula line” was that the Soviet Union would use 
nuclear weapons only against “another nuclear power” committing “aggression” 
through nuclear or non-nuclear means.64 
A further step toward arms limitation was taken on May 18 in Geneva, when 
the two superpowers agreed on a common framework for a prospective SALT II. 
Meanwhile Brezhnev continued to extend his authority when, in June, thanks to the 
new constitution, he established the supremacy of the Party leader in the Soviet 
government. In November, Brezhnev was also declared Commander-in-Chief of the 
Soviet Armed Forces. It seemed as if the overarching power to lay down the 
parameters of defense policymaking rested solely in the hands of the civilian 
leadership.65  
 
2.6. The rift in the military leadership66 
2.6.1. The Chief of Staff versus Brezhnev 
 For the first time during the period under review, the Defense Minister and 
the Chief of Staff began working at cross-purposes. Ogarkov, who had showed a 
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65 Robin Edmonds, Soviet Policy: The Brezhnev Years, pp. 158, 162. 
66 This section is based upon Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1976-1989, pp. 126-127, 
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discernible approval of détente at the outset, later articulated his mistrust about the 
international developments and adopted an unvarnished rhetoric toward the U.S.  
 As a career military officer, traditionally holding a pessimistic stance toward 
arms limitation, Ogarkov launched a fierce budgetary offensive, making exorbitant 
resource demands. In May 1977, he had noted that the Soviet army and navy 
possessed everything necessary to fulfill their tasks.67 While similar expressions had 
followed for a year, Ogarkov showed a change of tone in 1979, pointing to the need 
to devote attention to an imminent scientific-technological revolution in military 
affairs so as not to lag behind the imperialist forces in arms development. From his 
standpoint, funds allocated for military research and development had to be 
massively increased.  
 One major reason for his alertness was NATO’s decision to adopt the Long-
Term Development Program in 1978, which had led to the deployment of the 
Pershing-IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM)68. This initiative was an 
outcome of the unallayed concerns of the West, about the appearance during the mid-
to-late 1970s of new or improved weapons systems (in particular the Backfire69, the 
SS-20 and SS-21s), which attested to a shift away from the Tula line.70 
 
2.6.2. The Defense Minister-Brezhnev partnership 
 Dmitrii Ustinov had spent almost his entire career in the Soviet military-
industrial complex, but was not a career officer. With a background in management 
he chose to play the political game and acted with circumspect while expressing his 
                                                 
67 Izvestiia, May 9, 1977 quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, p. 155. 
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views. Although, at times, he presented a grim picture of the international arena 
paralleling that of Ogarkov, Ustinov chose to side with the General Secretary. 
Therefore, it fell to the Chief of Staff to spell out the need for vigilance against 
imperialist traps. 
 As negotiations continued during the SALT II process, the divergence of 
opinions between the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff became clearer. In his 
1979 Partiinaia Zhizn’ article, Ogarkov cautioned against inclination to “turn a blind 
eye” to the “aggressive thrust” of Western military preparations.71 From Ustinov’s 
viewpoint, however, a “relaxation of tensions” marked the day and the Soviet 
military was already at a sufficient level to guarantee the security “of the 
motherland” and of “socialism and communism” whenever conditions necessitated.72 
 
2.7. Civil-military relations amidst international and domestic turmoil  
The five-year moratorium of SALT I had expired in 1977 without a successor 
agreement. After two years of protracted negotiations in an environment of 
deteriorating Soviet-American relations, SALT II was signed on 18 June 1979 
between the superpowers in Vienna. Nevertheless, it would never be brought into 
force on account of opposition by the U.S. Senate. However, both the Soviet and the 
U.S. governments observed its provisions over the next two years. The tripartite 
treaty included an eight-year compromise, a protocol to last until the end of 1982, 
and a statement of guidelines for SALT III. To summarize, the numbers of launchers 
were limited to 2,250 with a sub-ceiling of 1,320 for MIRV-equipped ballistic 
missile launchers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). Production of new 
                                                 
71 Partiinaia Zhizn’, No. 4, (1979) quoted in Jeremy Azrael, The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the 
Military High Command: 1976-1986, p. 176. 
72 Kommunist, No. 3, (1977) quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command: 1967-1989, p. 
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heavy missiles was prohibited. Yet, existing missile systems could be modernized 
within prescribed limits. As in SALT I, verification of compliance was specified by 
national technical means. The participants agreed on notifying each other of missile 
testing and of exchanging information on their nuclear arsenals. The Soviet 
superiority in ICBM numbers and the U.S. superiority in the total number of 
warheads continued. However, the Soviet Union was compelled to dismantle more 
strategic vehicles than the U.S. in order to meet the stated limit. Furthermore, the 
issue of U.S. theater bombers based in Europe remained unresolved.73 
Unconvinced about the prospects of SALT II, NATO devised a ‘dual-track’ 
scheme, which stipulated that if superpower negotiations on missile deployments 
backfired, NATO would consider installing new missiles starting late 1983. 
Accordingly, if negotiations ended in failure, NATO would deploy 572 missiles, 108 
of which would be Pershing-II medium-range ballistic missiles. The decision was a 
response to Moscow’s sustained military buildup employed in disguise under the 
pretext of continuation of programs within restrictions contained in SALT I and II. 
Western fears deserved credit for, at the urging of Ogarkov, the civilian leadership 
had sanctioned the establishment of the so-called ‘theaters of military operations’ 
TVD-Teatr Voennykh Deistvii)74 to function between various fronts and supreme 
military headquarters in Moscow. The initiative would continue well into 1984.75  
                                                 
73 Robin Edmonds, Soviet Policy: The Brezhnev Years, p. 164; Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. 
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The West would be further alarmed at Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 
December 1979, a decision taken upon consideration that China, Pakistan and the 
U.S. had joined their efforts to establish a new “anti-Soviet place d’armes” on the 
Soviet-Afghan frontier that would threaten “the very existence of Afghanistan as an 
independent state.”76  
 Anxious about NATO counterdeployments, Brezhnev hastened to take the 
initiative. In his November 1979 Plenum speech, the Party leader drew attention to 
the need for improving  “the lot of the general populace” at the expense of military 
spending.77 This decision almost nearly coincided with the stirrings in Poland, which, 
in 1980, helped catalyse the domestic food crisis. As the Polish government sought to 
handle external debts through cutting back food subsidies, discontent eventuated in a 
wave of strikes, reminding the Soviet civilian leadership that neglect of consumer 
needs might bring with it severe political repercussions.78  
Brezhnev conveyed this message clearly in February that, the Soviet Army 
and Navy had “everything necessary to repulse any type of military provocation.”79 
The Defense Minister shared the same viewpoint stating that the West, due to its 
shrinking opportunities, had finally acknowledged the necessity to abide by the 
principle of peaceful coexistence.80 Later in the year though, he would express some 
concern about imperialist forces, provoking new conflicts in a number of regions. 
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However, he would reiterate the viability of détente despite his calling for increased 
attention to defense needs between the lines.81   
 
2.8. The tenure ends without settlement 
 As 1980 proceeded, Ogarkov’s critique of civilian leadership did not cease at 
all. Shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan, he charged the U.S. of making military 
preparations to achieve superiority over Soviet capabilities. He extended his criticism 
further when, in May, he spoke of a concerted American-British effort in 
encouraging the Germans to move against the Soviet Union. Characterizing the 80s 
with “extreme instability […] and intensification of the aggressive aspirations of the 
imperialist countries and China,” Ogarkov uttered his skepticism regarding the 
continuity of détente.82 Later, he also added Japan to the anti-Soviet front, stressing 
the need for caution against the U.S.-China-Japan alliance, which resembled “the 
infamous Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis” of the 1930s.83 
 The battle over resources endured throughout 1981. At the 26th Party 
Congress, Brezhnev enunciated clearly that “foodstuffs, consumer goods and the 
services sphere” would receive priority in the upcoming Eleventh Five-Year Plan 
(1981-85). The General Secretary, admitting that, the U.S. in particular, had become 
more aggressive, conveyed his belief in the new (Reagan) administration’s more 
realistic attitude toward problems. Brezhnev underscored that Soviet defense 
spending was at a sufficient level and that arms control was a task of “special 
meaning and urgency.” As he reiterated the necessity to deal with the debilitating 
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food shortages, he called on the military establishment to focus on research and 
development on behalf of Soviet consumers.84 Repeating in May his trust in some 
“sober people among the capitalist leaders,” by the end of 1981, Brezhnev 
commented upon preparedness to take additional steps toward the country’s defense 
in case of any need.85 His speech to the November 1981 Central Committee Plenum 
was indicative of a clear insistence on treating the food problem as a “political 
imperative.”86 Brezhnev’s efforts toward the cause of further disarmament bore fruit 
when, on 30 November, the two superpowers began formal negotiations in Geneva 
concerning intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF- also known as theatre nuclear 
forces or Euromissiles) during which the U.S. President Ronald Reagan proposed the 
so-called ‘zero option.’ Accordingly, the United States would cancel its deployment 
of Pershing-IIs and GLCMs if the Soviet Union dismantled its SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 
missiles. Parenthetically, the INF also set the stage for START (Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks), the new name accorded to SALT by the Reagan Administration.87 
 The Defense Minister was supportive of civilian leadership. From Ustinov’s 
standpoint, there was no reason to yield to “war hysteria.”88 Attacking the West for 
relying upon militarism in foreign policymaking, he underlined the defensive nature 
of Soviet military doctrine, according to which forces were being developed “without 
going beyond the needs of deterrence.”89 He made it clear that a strong military was 
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just “one of the tools” for the protection of the Soviet Union and emphasized the 
need to cooperate with “the peaceloving, realistic circles in the West,” arguing that it 
was possible to negotiate with imperialist forces.90 
 In contradistinction to these views, Ogarkov saw an inhospitable West 
determined to strengthen its military capabilities across the board. Claiming that the 
U.S. was expanding its arsenal “not simply to please the military-industrial complex 
but with the aim of direct war preparation,” he expressed a clear worry about the 
possibility of the breakdown of détente. Moreover, he labeled the “aggressive nature 
of imperialism” as “unchanging.”91 
 In July 1981, Ogarkov delivered another somber assessment of the 
international situation, conveying his mistrust of the Reagan Administration and 
NATO. Pointing to the “element of surprise in contemporary war,” the chief of staff 
incessantly demanded wide-ranging measures to better prepare for a prospective war. 
In effect, the use of nuclear weapons was not Ogarkov’s preferred option. Yet, he 
was convinced that the West would be the first to utilize such weapons.92 This article 
constituted a clear violation of protocol since the chief of staff went to considerable 
lengths in criticizing party propaganda explicitly.93  
 Throughout 1982, Brezhnev continued to voice support for détente, 
underlining that “not a single ruble more [would] be spent than [was] absolutely 
necessary” for the country’s defense.94 In his address to the 17th Trade Union 
Congress on March 16, he took a major step, announcing a unilateral “moratorium on 
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the deployment of medium-range nuclear armaments in the European part of the 
USSR.” However, he also assured that retaliatory steps would be taken if the U.S. 
and NATO went ahead with counterdeployments.95 On May 18, at the inception of 
the 19th  Komsomol96 Congress, the General Secretary enumerated the major 
decisions taken by the party “to further raise living conditions.”97 Adoption of the 
Food Program at the Central Committee Plenum on May 24 signified the realization 
of Brezhnev’s long-cherished goal toward increased agricultural spending. 
Accordingly, investment of 233 billion rubles in the agroindustrial complex was to 
be ensured in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1981-1985).98  
The June declaration of the unilateral commitment not to use nuclear 
weapons first was later followed by Brezhnev’s address to a major conference of the 
command personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy in which the civilian leadership’s 
policy on military spending was reaffirmed. For the Party leader, since the Armed 
Forces were already equipped with the most advanced weapons and military 
hardware, the high command “should always be worthy of this concern.”99 
The contrast between Ustinov and Ogarkov became more visible as 
Brezhnev’s tenure drew to a close. In his 127-page monograph, Ustinov reiterated 
that military defense was only a means among many available for protecting the 
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country.100 Conveying a hopeful prognosis for the future of détente, Ustinov echoed 
a Brezhnevian statement that the Soviet Armed Forces had “all they need to resolve 
successfully the tasks entrusted to them.”101 The Defense Minister tried extensively 
to sell the military on the Food Program. He also repeatedly stated that the growth of 
the armed forces should go hand in hand with the development of “political and 
economic components of national defense capacity.”102 Claiming it futile  “to gamble 
on military superiority,” Ustinov reckoned that the “available armaments” already 
sufficed to destroy biological life on earth.103 In a major speech on September 2 in 
Kuybyshev, he also made numerous references to the general secretary and the 
accuracy of his assessments.104 
Ogarkov, on the other hand, sounded more alarming than ever. Insisting on 
labeling the U.S. menace as aggressive and persistent, the Chief of Staff spoke of the 
pursuit of a “global offensive on socialism.” He believed that mere deterrence was 
not enough to contain a wide network of military bases organized under the U.S. 
leadership and called for buttressing the combat potential of the Soviet Armed 
Forces.105 From his viewpoint, war had ceased to be a “simple and delicate type of 
social relationship.” Therefore, the resources had to be fully mobilized to counter a 
surprise attack.106  In an attempt to obtain a greater share for the military budget, 
Ogarkov began to lobby for closer economic-military integration, referring to the 
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need for “a system of centralized control of the country and the armed forces,” but to 
no avail.107 He would later try his hand during Andropov’s tenure.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE ANDROPOV-CHERNENKO INTERREGNUM  
(1982-1984/1984-1985) 
 
 
3.1. The Andropov era (November 1982-February 1984) 
3.1.1. Andropov enforces discipline 
 The successor to the office of General Secretary of the CPSU may seem to 
signify the endurance of gerontocratic inertia. Over 10 years older than Brezhnev 
was in 1964, Yuri Andropov, just like his predecessor, suffered an ailing health. 
Nevertheless, his sponsorship of the younger generation in policymaking would 
inspire the blossoming of ‘new thinking’ under Mikhail Gorbachev and seal the fate 
of the USSR. 
At a time when the Soviet Union looked for a person with stature and 
strength to handle the daunting tasks of economic and administrative reforms, 
Andropov was certainly not dressed for the mission. Totally agnostic about the 
economy, a field in which he had never worked, Andropov nevertheless rose to 
prominence given his background as the former head of KGB. His supporters pinned 
their hopes on the possibility that the new Party leader was well qualified to enforce 
law, order and discipline. His lengthy administrative, party and diplomatic 
experience, particularly his effective management of troubled East European affairs 
further boosted Andropov’s credibility.108   
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 Early retirement and labor discipline were the two subcategories of 
Andropov’s extensive anti-corruption program that was to become the distinguishing 
feature of his brief tenure. It was designed to detect and remove inefficient 
bureaucrats and blackmarketeers that had long been encumbering economic and 
institutional productivity. Andropov strived to place young and trusted supporters in 
government and party posts in an attempt to increase the efficiency of these 
organizations. The initiative appealed in particular to the military who detested the 
legal privileges of the nomenklatura109 and who were concerned about industrial 
reorganization and modernization for defense purposes.110 To the dismay of the high 
command, however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gained leverage in defense 
making, a tradition to be observed also by Andropov’s successors.111 Frustration on 
the military’s part would mount as the Party leader unveiled his intent to curb 
defense spending and negotiate with the West.  
 
3.1.2. Civilian leadership opts for butter: Brezhnevism resurrected 
The new civilian leadership soon proved to be following in the steps of 
Brezhnev, holding the line in favor of consumer satisfaction and arms control. In his 
first policy speech at the November 22 Plenum, Andropov’s initial inclination 
appeared to be the fulfillment of the Food Program and the development of working 
and living conditions. He dealt only perfunctorily with the need to buttress defense 
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capabilities, stating that the Army and Navy had long been provided with adequate 
supplies. Though he played to the military galleries by siding with the high command 
in their harsh assessment of the imperialist threat, he underlined that a world without 
arms was the ideal of socialism. Articulating his belief in the prospect of détente, 
Andropov claimed that arms control talks were the means for settling the most 
complex problems in order to achieve results of benefit to all sides.112    
In a keynote report on December 21, at celebrations marking the sixtieth 
anniversary of the USSR, Andropov, once again, denounced the war preparations 
undertaken by the U.S. and NATO that had reached “ an unheard-of-record scale.” 
The General Secretary also spoke of “corresponding weapons systems” that would 
readily counter the U.S. MX Missile Project (Missile-X)113 or long-range cruise 
missiles.114 Yet, conveying the Soviet efforts to find a common ground between the 
parties, he declared the readiness to retain in Europe only as many missiles as Britain 
and France had. This was a major concession aimed to reduce dozens of SS-20s, 
which were newer and more accurate than the Anglo-French forces and, unlike them, 
were capable of a first strike.115   
 The Political Declaration released upon the Warsaw Pact summit in Prague in 
early January 1983 further emphasized the necessity of international cooperation for 
astute handling of “global problems of a social, economic, demographic and 
ecological character.” The declaration also dwelled upon the urgency to de-
ideologize foreign policy and “build relations with capitalist states on the basis of 
                                                 
112 Yu. Andropov, “Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee,” November 22, 1982 in 
Yu. Andropov, Izbrannie rechi i stat’i, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), pp. 209-218. 
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115 Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, p. 329. 
 37 
peaceful coexistence.”116 The same theme was repeated later in a major article in 
Kommunist devoted to the centenary of the death of Marx. Accordingly, Andropov 
wrote about new concerns faced by the mankind, stressing that preserving peace and 
avoiding thermonuclear disaster should rank at the top of every nation’s priority 
list.117  
 Nevertheless, President Reagan’s pronouncements in March came as a severe 
blow to the constructive approach adopted by the General Secretary. The U.S. 
President not only labeled the Soviet Union an ‘evil empire’, but also announced his 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, also  called the ‘Star Wars’ program), a space 
based strategic defense system that was to protect the country from Soviet nuclear 
attack by intercepting Soviet ICBMs.118 In reply, Andropov castigated the U.S. for 
increasing its nuclear arsenal by a factor of 2.5 and for referring to it unashamedly as 
inactivity, and invited the country to join Moscow in preventing a nuclear 
catastrophe.119    
 In May, he reiterated the intention to reach agreement on the equality of 
nuclear potentials in Europe both as regards delivery vehicles and warheads with a 
due account for the corresponding armaments of Britain and France. At the same 
time, he continued attacking the U.S. for derailing the successful conclusion of the 
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peace talks and imposing on other nations the American way of life to gain world 
domination.120 
 
3.1.3. Civilian-military divergence persists 
 For his part, Ustinov concurred with Andropov on defense issues. In 
December 1982 the Defense  Minister highlighted the menacing nature of the 
external threat, yet he lavished praise on the civilian leadership. Underscoring that 
“the Soviet Union had a clear advantage in practically every category of military 
power,” he conveyed that the Armed Forces were able “effectively and promptly” to 
counter threats.121 
 In early April 1983, Ustinov referred to Andropov as head of the Politburo.122 
His assumption of the Defense Council chairmanship in May was also publicized for 
the first time by Ustinov. These promotions would be followed by Andropov’s 
conquest of the presidency at a June 1983 Plenum of the Central Committee.123 
 In the first half of 1983, Ogarkov’s statements displayed a tone of moderation 
and of satisfaction with the status quo. More generous in his gratitude to the civilian 
leadership, the Chief of Staff contended that the “Armed Forces had everything 
necessary for the high-quality fulfillment of the tasks set for them.”124 Later on he 
lined up on the opposite side with Andropov and Ustinov, resurrecting his 
acrimonious pronouncements on the imperialist threat. His Victory Day article in 
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Izvestiia conveyed the Chief of Staff’s concerns regarding the U.S. “space strike 
systems for military purposes and weapons complexes based on new physical 
principles.” Ogarkov also called for the establishment of a high-level command 
organization in peacetime in light of NATO’s capability of launching a surprise 
attack.125 
 International tension rose to the limit on 1 September 1983 with the shooting 
down of a South Korean passenger airliner (KAL 007), which had strayed into 
Russian airspace. The loss of 269 lives including one U.S. Congressman catalyzed 
the British government to begin deploying American cruise missiles in mid-
November. The West German parliament followed, voting on 22 November to accept 
Pershing-II.126 Although Ustinov understated the urgency of improving the Soviet 
defense posture in case a new counterdeployment eventuated after the KAL incident, 
Ogarkov went to considerable lengths in depicting the external threat as “reminiscent 
of fascism’s actions in the thirties.”127 The final response came on 23 November 
1983 when the Soviet delegation walked out of the Geneva arms talks (INF talks) 
and began deploying more SS-20 and SS-22 missiles in the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany.128  
Yet, Andropov’s propensity was one of reiterating commitment to détente. In 
late-September, the Party leader conveyed his hopes about  “broadening and 
deepening cooperation between states.”129 This was also the time when his health 
took a sudden turn for worse. As he could not attend the Central Committee Plenum 
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on December 26, copies of his speech conveying a reaffirmation of ideas and 
programs on consumer satisfaction were distributed at the session. The need to 
improve living standards and to “satiate the market with the necessary manufactured 
goods” appeared as the main theme of his pronouncements. As regards defense 
spending, it was restated that “everything necessary ha[d] been envisaged to maintain 
the country’s defense capacity at a proper level.”130  
Ogarkov, disappointed with the civilian leadership’s inactivity about 
attending to the military’s needs, demanded a more “profound and farsighted 
assessment of […] military-political events” and enhancement of the Armed Forces’ 
combat readiness.131 Nevertheless, Andropov’s death would not allow this to be 
realized. His brief secretaryship ended on February 9, 1984 leaving behind a short-
lived discipline campaign that failed to cure corruption, absenteeism and suppressed 
inflation.132                             
 
3.2. The Chernenko era (February 1984-March 1985) 
3.2.1. Chernenko upholds the official line 
 At a time of heightening challenge from the West and major unresolved 
domestic problems bequeathed from Andropov, the Politburo opted for a new leader 
who would represent no risks or surprises. Given the partial implementation of 
Andropov’s campaigns, the country was beset by immobilism and uncertainty about 
the prospect. A malleable Party leader, as it was thought, would not further 
deteriorate the problematic status quo with unrealistic policy choices. The decision 
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was finally made in favor of Konstantin Chernenko, who was already suffering from 
emphysema when he took over as general secretary. 
 Within two months, Chernenko fared well in acquiring the three posts, the 
General Secretary, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the President 
respectively. During his tenure, Andropov’s campaigns to eliminate corruption were 
dropped. Yet, attempts to ameliorate the ailing economy continued, albeit with little 
success. Increased visibility of Defense Minister Ustinov and, in particular, the 
Foreign Minister Gromyko as regards foreign policymaking continued. 
Complementing this, Ogarkov’s ouster finally took place, since his calls for 
appropriation of more funds to meet military demands had long been considered 
unbearable.133   
Chernenko refrained from articulating any direct criticism of the military’s 
performance or of its management of resources. Nevertheless, he implicitly lobbied 
for a continuation of the investment mix. Put in other words, this involved increased 
allocations for social programs together with a freeze on military expenditure.134 The 
Party leader, though admitting that international pressures and preservation of peace 
demanded strengthening the country’s defense capacity, enunciated that there would 
be no contemplation of any cutting back on social programs.135 His tenure also 
witnessed a return to a more traditional and extensivist approach to the agricultural 
problem as observed in the ‘Long Term Programme for Land Improvement’ initiated 
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in October 1984. According to this highly expensive project, priority was accorded to 
expanding both the cultivated and irrigated areas.136  
 
3.2.2. The Defense Minister-Chernenko congruence 
In addressing the imperialist threat, Ustinov’s remarks were consonant with 
those of Chernenko. His Armed Forces Day article in Pravda on February 23 
conveyed a zealous effort to direct attention to Washington’s actions “aimed at 
establishing world domination and primarily at achieving military superiority over 
the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries.”137 The same viewpoint was echoed 
by Chernenko, who, in his election speech, charged Americans with creating 
obstacles to the peace talks through deploying missiles in Europe. For the civilian 
leadership, the Reagan Administration’s “peaceably sounding statements” could be 
construed as a means to “camouflage the arms race and cold war policy.” Slighting 
the Europeans’ share of the onus as regards INF deployments, Chernenko portrayed 
the adventurist United States as the only responsible party on the issue.138  
 Chernenko’s criticism of U.S. arms control policy was later repeated in a 
banquet speech on May 4. In brief, the General Secretary referred to any hope of “an 
evolution for the better in the American Administration’s policy” as mere illusion.139 
At the same occasion, Ustinov joined Chernenko in denouncing the U.S. INF 
deployments, which had “wrecked the Geneva talks.”140 
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 In late-May, Chernenko was much more accommodating on the high 
command’s needs since he contended that “military might was a more fundamental 
guarantee of Soviet security than diplomacy.” Cautioning against political forces 
“deaf to the arguments of reason,” he praised the deterrent power of Soviet defense 
potential.141  
 
3.2.3. Chief of Staff as the military’s spokesman 
 The Chief of Staff went to even greater lengths in rebuking the imperialist 
countries for being “revanchist neofascist organizations” and demanded the readiness 
of the Armed Forces to deal an immediate counterstrike against any aggressor to be 
guaranteed at all instances.142  
 However, neither Chernenko, nor the Ustinov-Gromyko duo was intent to 
endorse extraordinary measures to buttress the country’s defenses. As May drew to a 
close, Ustinov reiterated this view in a brief remark, which called for working 
perseveringly to strengthen the country’s economy.143 
 To the further disappointment of Ogarkov, “cordial, constructive and 
professional” meetings between U.S. and Soviet naval officers ensued toward the end 
of May in Moscow. On July 17, the superpowers signed an agreement on upgrading 
the Washington-Moscow Hot Line.144 Ustinov also articulated a milder statement on 
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U.S.-Soviet relations expressing his belief that the West would correctly understand 
and appreciate Soviet intentions.145 Moreover, Gromyko would later meet President 
Reagan in Washington on 28 September 1984, and make arrangements for the 
resumption of Geneva arms control talks to begin in March 1985.146   
Against this backdrop, change in the high command became a dire necessity. 
Ogarkov had long proved to be a nuisance in civil-military relations given his 
vehemence on the development of sophisticated conventional weapons and of high-
technology defensive control systems corresponding to the U.S. ‘Star Wars’ 
program. Nevertheless, the idea was dismissed as constituting a resource threat to the 
traditional lower-technology heavy defense industries and to the civilian economy.147 
On May 5, the Chief of Staff was removed on account of “unpartylike” behavior and 
was replaced by his principal deputy, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev. At the time of 
Andropov’s tenure, Akhromeyev’s promotion from a first deputy chief of the 
General Staff to the rank of marshal of the Soviet Union had signified an 
extraordinary case most probably designed to circumscribe Ogarkov’s authority. 
Throughout 1983, Akhromeyev pursued a flexible line on INF concessions compared 
to Ogarkov. In addition, he was known for his less confrontational public profile.148 
 
3.2.4. Civilian authority prevails 
With Ustinov’s death on December 20, 1984, the civilian leadership further 
solidified its privileged position in defensemaking. The person chosen for the job 
was a man devoid of any political ambitions or special interest in matters such as 
arms control. Sergei Sokolov, though a military officer, did not signify the high 
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command’s strengthened hold on security matters. It was rather the reverse, since 
Sokolov’s exclusion from the Politburo suggested a diminution in military vis-à-vis 
party influence over policy decisions.149  
As Sokolov had spent the greater part of his career as an administrator, with 
special expertise in logistics, he was unlikely to bring forth new approaches for 
handling problems facing the military. Accordingly, it fell to Akhromeyev to voice 
the military’s interests in arms control. He skillfully negotiated with the political 
leadership over the structure of future agreements and continued to be an influential 
figure also during Gorbachev’s tenure.150 
In the remainder of his term, Chernenko continued to talk hopefully about 
peaceful resolution of conflicts, stating that U.S.-Soviet relations should be 
constructed  “on the basis of equality with due account taken of the legitimate 
interests of each other.”151 He suffered a serious health relapse in mid-January and 
died on March 10, 1985. Chernenko’s was a caretaker regime elected merely not to 
rock the boat.152 Therefore, no significant programs were inaugurated under his 
leadership. The floor was left to Mikhail Gorbachev who would introduce a 
comprehensive reorientation of defensemaking that would leave a profound impact 
on civil-military relations. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE GORBACHEV ERA (1985-1991) 
 
 
4.1. Civilian leadership endeavors reform153 
 Mikhail Gorbachev bequeathed from his heirs a Soviet Union in abysmal 
condition. Economic stagnation and inefficiency had reached to a nearly irreversible 
point. Negative trends in labor productivity, supply of goods and in agricultural 
output, lack of national initiative in technology production as well as poor 
transportation and communication infrastructure reflected a gloomy picture. 
Economic growth showed a decline from 7.5 percent under the Eightieth Five-Year 
Plan (1966-1970) to 2.5 percent under the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1981-1985).  
 Against this backdrop, Gorbachev placed a premium on domestic 
imperatives. In order to revamp national economy, he saw the need to rationalize a 
reallocation of resources from the defense sector to the consumer sector. 
Accordingly, he spearheaded a comprehensive reform in Soviet foreign policy. His 
‘new thinking’154 was based upon demilitarization of Soviet decisionmaking with 
due emphasis on interdependence and mutual security. It signified a shift in the 
Soviet worldview, which stipulated a decrease in international tension to ensure the 
success of domestic restructuring. 
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 What was novel and radical in this formulation was that its most important 
element was repudiation of a core Marxist-Leninist precept155, namely, the emphasis 
on international class struggle. The idea of redefining security in economic, not 
military terms had been articulated by Gorbachev’s predecessors. Yet, he remolded 
this viewpoint in light of a new understanding, which opened the floor for the 
questioning of Soviet ideological underpinnings and developed them into a cohesive 
doctrine. His initiative did not refer to a complete renunciation of socialism. Rather, 
his attempt sought to bring a new quality to the doctrine. Also, unlike other leaders, 
Gorbachev refrained from labeling the U.S. as the sole culprit in disruption of East-
West relations and equally blamed the Soviet Union for its role in impairing 
cooperation. A last differentiation was his contention that the core threat to Soviet 
security was not the traditional imperialist attack from the West, but rather an 
unintended nuclear confrontation that would start through accident or miscalculation. 
Accordingly, he attached utmost importance to broadening the scope and 
accelerating the pace of arms control negotiations. 
 Within this framework, class interests were subordinated to those of 
humanity; the nature of threat was redefined as economic and utility of political over 
military means and of mutual security over absolute military advantage was 
highlighted. ‘Reasonable sufficiency’ in defense became deeply embedded in 
policymaking as an oft-articulated watchword. This concept featured quality over 
quantity regarding weapons and military personnel. It implied increased weight of 
civilian leadership over the defense agenda and future resource commitments.  The 
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effort to expand civilian influence over security policy was also reflected in 
organizational changes through which the military establishment found its traditional 
autonomy challenged, this time not only by the highest institutions of 
decisionmaking (in particular, the Defense Council), but also by other civilian bodies 
(the Supreme Soviet, the liberal press) engaged in various levels of the process. 
Specialists drawn from the Academy of Sciences156 research institutes, prominent 
among them the Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada (ISKAN) and the 
Institute for the Study of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), 
were also instrumental in the formulation of Soviet national defense policy.  
 
4.2. Civilian hold over policymaking: beginning of unilateral concessions 
 Gorbachev’s “peace offensive” began in the spring of 1985 with the motives 
of repairing relations with the West through a series of arms control agreements and 
to reap the material benefits of an enhanced dialogue.  On April 7, he took the first 
step towards realization of these goals. Highlighting the necessity to go beyond the 
détente of the 1970s, the general secretary publicized his intention of an 
unconditional moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles 
in Europe. This was followed, 10 days later, by a call for a second moratorium on the 
underground testing of U.S. and Soviet weapons, to begin in August.157  
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 Gorbachev was sanguine about progress in superpower relations despite his 
acknowledgement of Western hostility to obtain military superiority. Promising to 
safeguard Soviet strategic parity he, nevertheless, expressed his firm belief in 
feasibility of utilizing political means. The Party leader also underlined his 
observation on the adequacy of the current defense budget, emphasizing instead the 
primacy of technological and economic development in order to ensure Soviet 
superpower status.158 If socioeconomic progress of the country were accomplished, 
then the nation’s defense potential would automatically follow.159 To maintain his 
security approach and justify the shifts in Soviet policymaking, Gorbachev also 
presented a new reading of Soviet history, positing that some of the responsibility for 
the rise of Hitler belonged to then-adopted Soviet political line.160 
 In accord with these, the General Secretary called for “drastic change in 
investment and structure policy” during the Central Committee conference on 
science and technology on June 11-12, 1985. There he unveiled his intent to double 
investments, particularly in civilian machine building. Though Gorbachev reiterated 
his complaint about the “immense funds” earmarked for defense, he pledged that, for 
the time being, spending on social programs and the military would remain intact. 
However, this policy would be contingent upon meeting target levels in economic 
progress.161 
 In August 1985, Gorbachev announced a unilateral five-month moratorium 
on the testing of nuclear weapons, adding that the ban would be extended indefinitely 
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if the U.S. agreed to take part. This conciliatory gesture was the first of several others 
to follow, designed to boost the credibility of Gorbachev in the eyes of the West 
regarding the sincerity of his reform pledges. Yet, it failed to arouse much reaction 
on the adversary’s side. The U.S. continuously declined the disavowal of the SDI 
programme. Nevertheless, the two parties agreed on meeting on November 19-20 to 
resume negotiations.162 
 For propaganda purposes, Gorbachev designed a high profile visit to Paris to 
take place on October 2-5. In an interview before his departure to Paris, Gorbachev 
remarked that ideological differences did not constitute an obstacle to cooperate on 
issues of war and peace, demonstrating the willingness that he attached to peaceful 
settlement of disputes.163 
 In Paris, the General Secretary launched the notion of ‘reasonable 
sufficiency’ – a concept that would prove to be a watershed in Soviet-American 
relations. Underlining the impossibility to build a lasting peace on deterrence, 
Gorbachev proposed to reduce strategic offensive forces by 50 percent and to delink 
the INF and SDI. By agreeing to conclude an accord limiting intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles without having solved the problem of space and strategic arms, the 
Party leader went counter to the official Soviet position. Gorbachev also announced a 
reduction in SS-20 deployments and complete withdrawal of “the old, and very 
powerful” SS-5 missiles.164 Back in Moscow, in his speech to the October Plenum 
                                                 
162 Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution, p. 97. 
163 Moscow Television Service, October 1, 1985 quoted in John W. Parker, Kremlin in Transition: 
Gorbachev, 1985-1989, p. 59. 
164 Moscow Domestic Service, October 3, 1985 quoted in John W. Parker, Kremlin in Transition: 
Gorbachev, 1985-1989, p. 60; “Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central 
Committee, Addresses the French National Assembly and Senate”, Survival, (March/April 1986), pp. 
163-164 quoted in Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution, p. 98. 
 51 
before the Central Committee, the Party leader reiterated a strong belief in the 
benefits of an “active political dialogue” vis-à-vis projection of military force.165 
 The Geneva summit in November fell short of Soviet expectations, failing to 
achieve a substantive conclusion with respect to arms control. According to the U.S., 
the SDI project was far from carrying deterrent qualities. Rather, it plainly served 
defensive purposes. In a spirited reply, Gorbachev impugned against the idea, 
confirming that, without a discontinuation of SDI, there could be no offensive cuts in 
START.166 
 
4.3. The military leadership expresses concern in vain 
 Against this backdrop, Defense Minister Sokolov demonstrated a notable 
disquietude. Portraying a grim picture of U.S. militarism, he demanded that the 
Soviet Armed Forces be upgraded to guarantee the country’s defense might. Drawing 
attention to the “severe lessons” of World War II, he called for increased 
vigilance.167 In his viewpoint, the American ‘Star Wars’ plan was designed as part of 
a first-strike strategy aimed at inflicting upon the Soviet Union irreparable harm.168 
When, in July 1985, Foreign Minister Gromyko was replaced with Eduard A. 
Shevardnadze -a close ally of Gorbachev and a full member of the Politburo whereas 
Sokolov was only a candidate member- Sokolov, for a brief interval, sought to 
concur with the civilian leadership. Gorbachev’s assuming the chairmanship of the 
Defense Council on August 1 was another source of brake on Sokolov’s stinging 
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criticisms. In a Pravda speech, he conveyed that “the armed forces had all they need 
to defend the country.”  In his address at the November 7 parade, he placed the 
satisfaction of consumer needs in first place. Nevertheless, he could not remain 
indifferent for long. As discussions on the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (1986-1990) came 
to a close, the Defense Minister reappeared on the scene, warning the political 
leadership against the aggressive designs of the West.169 
 For his part, the Chief of Staff Akhromeyev was less anxious on the issue of 
national security. Contrary to Sokolov, he stressed the need to adopt a “broad and 
realistic approach” and to take into consideration the economic possibilities of the 
country on questions of defense-readiness. He had long before realized that it was 
imperative to decrease tensions in East-West relations for enhanced security and 
economic healing. Akhromeyev’s championship of a flexible approach placed him 
among Gorbachev’s front advisors and most of the time he proved to be a skillful 
mediator between the civilian leadership and military establishment.170  
 
4.4. Organizational changes add to concessions 
Gorbachev’s ventures continued well into 1986. In January, the General 
Secretary announced a three-stage total nuclear disarmament program by the year 
2000. In parenthesis, he called for the reduction of conventional weapons to levels 
that would obstruct their use in offensive operations. These proclamations aimed at 
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influencing the Western public opinion in a way that would score points for the 
Soviet side in the forthcoming superpower negotiations.171 
The 27th Party Congress in February-March 1986 witnessed Gorbachev’s 
statements upon “radical reform.” Underscoring the necessity to establish  “a new 
economic mechanism” the Party leader advocated economic stimulation and 
financial autonomy. In order to accomplish these tasks, he conveyed his faith in the 
attainability of Soviet-American cooperation. Gorbachev rejected the employment of 
military-technical means for the purpose of ensuring security. Yet, at the same time, 
he gave public assurances that the Soviet Union would not engage in unilateral 
disarmament. These formulations were not new, however, and the Congress became 
the platform in which the Soviet leader stated his views explicitly and in detail. 
Parroting the traditional remarks on the Party’s “unremitting attention to the 
country’s defense capability,” he claimed that the armed forces already enjoyed 
“modern weaponry and technology at their disposal.”172 More annoying to the 
military was the decision adopted in the new program, which endowed the CPSU 
with the prerogative “to strengthen its organizing and directing influence on the life 
and activities of the Armed Forces.”173   
The explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine on April 26, 
1986 had several implications for the civilian and military leadership alike. Infamous 
for being the worst nuclear accident in history known so far, the Chernobyl incident 
displayed that the dangers of nuclear conflagration could be a truly concrete 
phenomenon. Through this experience, the military establishment’s solid stance on 
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the winnability of a nuclear war was truly challenged.174 This realization also 
catalyzed various organizational changes so as to establish a firm civilian hold on 
defense issues. The most notable was the creation of an Arms Control and 
Disarmament Directorate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in June 1986. A 
similar establishment followed in July, as a special arms control sector in the 
International Department (ID). To that date, national security matters had not fallen 
under the jurisdiction of ID. Questions pertaining to weapons development, force 
posture and military strategy was, up until the mid-1980s, under the sphere of the 
General Staff and the Ministry of Defence. Yet, with the advent of novel changes, 
both the ID and the MFA were authorized to encroach upon the military arena. 
Gorbachev’s aim was not to displace the military as a source of expertise and advice 
on defense issues. Rather, he sought an alternative source (liberal civilian analysts) 
for inspiration required for his radical restructuring programme.175 The Main 
Political Administration became the main channel to embed ‘new thinking’ in the 
Armed Forces.176 
 Gorbachev outlined a major new arms reduction proposal at the Central 
Committee Plenum on June 16. The initiative agreed to the continuance of SDI 
research yet, to be confined to the laboratory level only. It set forth a new INF 
compromise deal, which ignored British and French missile forces, but called for 
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America to continue to abide by the 1972 ABM Treaty for at least for another 15 
years.177 Akhromeyev, at the service of the civilian leadership to discourage 
opposition in the military, had his reservations on two areas. He was equally 
sensitive about unilateral gestures on the part of the Soviet Union and about the 
verification procedures, which could “turn into intelligence activity.” Although he 
was accommodating on arms control issues, the Chief of Staff confessed that the 
Soviet Union had to inflict considerable harm upon itself by making unilateral 
concessions. Nevertheless, he contended that the scope of this was not altogether 
intolerable.178  
  Another conciliatory proposal came two months later involving a loosening 
of Soviet restrictions on verification measures. These efforts by the civilian 
leadership fared well, eventuating in the signing of a Warsaw Pact-NATO 
conventional force “confidence building treaty”, which was signed in Stockholm in 
September 1986. It was during the same occasion that an accord on on-site 
inspections (a point the Soviet military had incessantly resisted) was signed and an 
agreement was made to hold a summit in Reykjavik on 11-12 October.179  
 Much to the annoyance of the civilian leadership, the Reykjavik summit 
failed to produce a positive outcome. On the contrary, it contributed to a cooling in 
Soviet-American relations. The Soviet proposal included a cross-board 50 percent 
cut in strategic missile forces and the elimination of all superpower intermediate-
range forces in Europe within five years. The latter meant Soviet acquiescence of the 
                                                 
177 TASS, June 6, 1986 quoted in John W. Parker, Kremlin in Transition: Gorbachev, 1985-1989, p. 
109; Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution, pp. 104-105. 
178 Pravda, January 19, 1986 and Gary Lee, “Soviets Successfully Use Nuclear Test Ban for 
International Campaign”, Washington Post, August 31, 1986 quoted in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet 
High Command: 1967-1989, pp. 253-254. 
179 Ian Derbyshire, The Politics in the Soviet Union, p. 75. 
 56 
‘zero option’ that Reagan had proposed during INF negotiations in November 1981. 
However, it was rejected, upon the U.S. refusal to bargain on SDI.180    
  
4.5. Re-bringing the military under control 
 In early 1987 the military began to show signs of coming in line with the 
civilian leadership. In an article that he wrote for Le Monde, Defense Minister 
Sokolov touched upon the destructive capabilities of weapons obstructing their 
utilization. Later, he named “war prevention” as the motto of Soviet military 
doctrine.181 Gorbachev would reiterate a similar theme in September, in concert with 
Akhromeyev. According to the General Secretary and the Chief of Staff, for a 
conventional war to turn into a nuclear war was no longer a remote possibility.182  
 Gorbachev’s announcement in late February of a willingness to reduce 
intermediate-range nuclear forces without waiting for a breakthrough in START, and 
his agreeing to a concession in April regarding the SS-23 missile without having 
consulted the high command, caused indignation among the military while heralding 
increased room for the civilian leadership to maneuver.183 Akhromeyev was highly 
irritated at the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze duo who had disregarded the opinion of the 
military on such a sensitive issue. Yet, in early May, Akhromeyev again rallied to the 
flag, stating that “nuclear war [could] only lead to mankind’s destruction.”184 
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 Again in February, Gorbachev raised his tone about defense spending that 
had become “a load on the economy” for it diverted “enormous resources that could 
be directed elsewhere.”185 He, moreover, cautioned against falling into Western 
traps, which sought to push the Soviet Union into military competition and, by this 
means, to drain the country’s economic might and slow its progress.186 
 On May 28, the undetected landing at the gates of Kremlin of a small Cessna 
aircraft belonging to a nineteen-year old West German youngster left Gorbachev 
with surprise and disappointment. Chastising the military as the only culprit for the 
incident, he, almost immediately, used it as a pretext to announce the removal of the 
Defense Minister Sokolov who had long proved to be a nuisance.  He was replaced 
by General Dmitrii Yazov, a long time supporter of Gorbachev’s reforms.187 His 
stance on arms control issues was exemplified in a Krasnaya zvezda article, 
conveying the new Defense Minister’s endorsement of the official line, namely 
“avoidance of war.” For him, the armed forces should devote due attention to 
“confidence building measures designed to prevent inadvertent war.”188 
Nevertheless, Gorbachev reckoned it best not to promote Yazov to full membership 
of the Politburo despite the latter’s being an efficient commander and a devout 
advocate of the ‘new thinking.’189 
 Gorbachev enjoyed bypassing military prerogatives in policymaking, and 
continued to move arbitrarily. In September, he allowed a U.S. congressional 
delegation to make inspections on the controversial Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar site –
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which the U.S. regarded as violating the ABM Treaty. One month later, he let the 
Western experts view the chemical weapons factory at Shikhany.190  In November, 
the General Secretary pointed out such countries as Japan, West Germany, Italy and 
the United States to stand as role models for the Soviet Union to emulate. 
Underlining that these countries had prospered on account of their adapting to the 
“new economic order,” Gorbachev implied that, in order to reinvigorate Soviet 
economy, disarmament should be realized.191  
The climax came with the signing of INF Treaty on December 8, which 
stipulated unequal reductions on the Soviet side. According to its provisions, all 
intermediate and shorter-range missiles and GLCMs with a range of between 300 
and 3,500 miles were to be totally eliminated. In line with these, the Soviets agreed 
to dismantle and destroy about 1,836 intermediate missiles, as well as 850 missile 
launchers. Nevertheless, the U.S. were to relinquish fewer than half as many missiles 
and only a third as many launchers. In short, the Soviets were bound to destroy 
almost three missiles for every single U.S. weapon. In addition to the ‘national 
technical means’, a comprehensive verification regime to buttress on-site as well as 
challenge inspections was adopted.192 This had long been a growing U.S. concern 
since satellites could only detect stationary missiles with single warheads.193  
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4.6. The Chief of Staff resigns upon concessions and changes 
In time, the military leadership seemed to adopt the line framed by the 
civilian authority. Proving to be worthy of Gorbachev’s trust, and following in 
Akhromeyev’s steps, Defense Minister Yazov, in his Order of the Day for Armed 
Forces Day in February 1988 refrained from touching upon “strengthening” or 
“maintenance” of Soviet defence capacity. On commenting upon conventional war, 
he conveyed the destructive nature of “modern chemical enterprises and power 
facilities” that would lead to catastrophic consequences.194   
In late May, Gorbachev took the giant step toward installing civilian rule over 
policymaking. Before the opening of the 19th Party Conference195 on June 28, he 
prepared and circulated a document of ten ‘theses’ involving his plans for a 
reshuffling of legislative structure and directives regarding foreign policy. The 
‘theses’ criticized the nomenklatura as an outdated and inefficient tradition, calling 
for a separation of Party functions from those of the government through 
democratization and rule of law in order to break with the over-centralization of 
decisionmaking. The ‘theses’ also called for “full restoration of the role and powers” 
of soviets196 of people’s deputies. Eventually, the Conference reorganized the Party 
apparatus by creating the Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD) as a governing body. 
A two-tier parliamentary structure was established in which the CPD was accepted as 
the most powerful body of government, among the members of which the deputies to 
the Supreme Soviet would be elected. Through this rearrangement, Gorbachev, as 
head of state and the general secretary, gained the right to function more 
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independently from the Party apparat. These novel structures would be approved in 
November by the necessary constitutional changes approved by the Supreme 
Soviet.197  
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze readily welcomed these proceedings. 
Claiming the right of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to oversee security policy, he 
advocated the urgency to subject the military to “democratic control” by “supreme 
national bodies.” From his viewpoint, such an initiative would prevent “severe 
economic side-effects” alluding to costly demands by the military for upgrading of 
the armed forces.198 In addition, Shevardnadze demanded increased privilege for the 
Ministry to check whether new military policies and weapons systems were in 
congruence with Soviet treaty obligations and political declarations.199  
Under dual attack by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, Akhromeyev delivered 
concern upon the military’s status in foreign policymaking. Stressing that it was the 
duty of the General Staff to initiate ‘new thinking’ in the army and navy, he 
conveyed the uneasiness regarding encroachment over military’s traditional 
privileges. Both Yazov and Akhromeyev made intense efforts regarding the 
implementation of ‘new thinking’ inside the armed forces, even chastising 
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commanders and staffs at times, for their slowness and timidity in “grasp[ing] the 
demands of the defensive strategy and operational art.”200 Akhromeyev also 
highlighted the necessity for reliable defense-preparedness in light of the continuing 
imperialist threat. Next, he added that the military establishment was devoting 
required attention to security issues so as not to necessitate another organ to 
supervise its dealings.201  
The fall of 1988 was stage to another heated debate on conventional arms, a 
matter which the high command found it hard to concur with its counterpart. In his 
article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Yazov broke his silence and 
articulated openly his distress about asymmetrical reductions on the side of the 
Soviet Union. Finding unilateral elimination of weapons as untenable, he called for 
“reciprocity in the military sphere.”202 Nevertheless, efforts to influence the civilian 
leadership backfired when Gorbachev fortified his personal status at the Central 
Committee Plenum on September 30 over Gromyko’s retirement from the post of 
chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (which he had assumed after 
his resignation as foreign minister). On October 1, the Supreme Soviet accepted 
Gromyko’s resignation and unanimously endorsed Gorbachev as the new Chairman 
(namely, the President). By this means, much to the disappointment of the military, 
the General Secretary gained more leverage over economic, social and foreign 
policy.203  
At the November 3 Politburo meeting, Gorbachev repeated his criticisms of 
the military, conveying that attainment of military objectives should not be 
accomplished at the expense of the population. Pointing out that the Soviet Union 
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was spending two and a half times more than the U.S. on defense needs, he 
underlined a fact that the former had got almost nothing in return by investing on 
arms.204 A landmark incident ensued the same month, conveying acceptance by the 
Chief of Staff, albeit unwillingly, of deeper cuts in military expenditure. 
Akhromeyev, under double-fire by political pressure and a deteriorating Soviet 
economy particularly beset by successive crises after the 19th Party Conference, 
dropped his reservations and acknowledged the necessity for unilateral reductions.205 
However, his yielding to the civilian authority would not last long. 
In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1988, 
Gorbachev publicized a dramatic concession on the issue of conventional arms. 
Accordingly, he promised unilaterally to withdraw 50,000 Soviet troops and 5,000 
Soviet tanks from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, to reduce the Soviet 
Armed Forces by 500,000 men by 1990, to withdraw from Eastern Europe all 
offensive equipment, to cut Soviet forces in the Atlantic-to-Urals area by 10,000 
tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft and to reorganize Soviet forces 
in Europe along defensive lines.206 Moreover, Gorbachev heralded a new 
transformation that began to re-characterize relations between the Soviet Union and 
its socialist allies. Renouncing interference in affairs of the allies, the Soviet leader 
declared that “freedom of choice” would mark the new era.207  
It was after these pronouncements that Akhromeyev resigned. Speculations 
prevail over whether it was because of his traditional uncompromising stance on 
unilateral concessions that paved the way for his resignation. Yet, the fact that he 
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assumed a new position as Gorbachev’s personal military advisor as well as to the 
Defense Council seems to cast a shadow on this probability.208  
 
4.7. The new Chief of Staff fights the army’s corner 
Akhromeyev’s successor was Col. General Mikhail Moiseyev, a young 
military officer with an interest in personnel issues as well as science and 
technology. Having little background in arms control or doctrinal matters, 
Moiseyev’s ascension to the post signified Gorbachev’s latent intention to continue 
enjoying his monopoly over defense issues.209 In the December 27 Politburo 
meeting, Gorbachev complained that for many military officers, the army was no 
more than a “feeding trough.” In his eyes, Moiseyev seemed to be the right choice 
that would handle aptly the daunting task of personnel orientation.210 By this means, 
he could continue headlong on arms control. 
In January 1989, the Soviet leader addressed a delegation in Moscow from 
the Trilateral Commission211 announcing a 19.5 percent cut in military hardware 
procurement and a 14.3 percent cut in the total military budget, effective by 1991. He 
also called for enhanced economic cooperation between the capitalist and socialist 
countries, without taking into consideration ideological differences.212 
To the dismay of Gorbachev, Moiseyev sided with the military leadership. In 
his first major speech on February 10, the Chief of Staff warned against “the 
aggressive orientation of imperialist policy” that had endured, underlining that it was 
the duty of the Soviet Armed Forces to be in utmost readiness to counter a potential 
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attack. Basing his claims on Marxist-Leninist grounds, Moiseyev sought increased 
vigilance and “to answer force with force.” From his viewpoint, civilian hold over 
defense questions should be relegated to secondary status, since it fell to military 
professionals to determine what was at stake for the country.213  
The first elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies were held on March 
26. Among the many groups that gained the right to represent themselves in this 
newly established body was the military, yet only to occupy 79 seats (3.6 percent of 
the Congress). The elections were the promise of an unbiased platform where every 
party would defend its rights and articulate grievances. However, inclusion of young 
reform-minded military officers to the Congress heralded a conflict of interests vis-à-
vis conservative senior officers. As the military divided into two factions, Gorbachev 
and Shevardnadze enjoyed the thought of gaining more breathing space for 
prospective negotiations with the West.214 
During the summer, Moiseyev took a more jaundiced view of U.S. intentions. 
In June, the Chief of Staff tried to defend the Soviet military budget indicating that 
the U.S. budget on defense far surpassed that of the Soviet Union. In July, he 
repeated his claim with regard to who should advise on military issues, stressing for 
one more time that it fell to the domain of the military only. Rebuking the so-called 
“military theorists,” -namely, the civilian analysts- Moiseyev alleged that their 
knowledge of the “life of the Armed Forces [was] at best derived from a few cinema 
films and a few books.”215 Yazov also demonstrated his discontent over 
Shevardnadze’s meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker in 
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September, during which the former had proposed to “disband both military 
alliances” and to delink START from SDI. To the further disappointment of the 
military, this meeting had been held without the high command’s knowledge. Behind 
this repeated fait accompli (the first was about concessions on SS-23) was the reason 
that, the Foreign Minister knew exactly about the military stance pertaining to cuts in 
strategic weapons.  Accordingly, the military would never consent to any reduction 
in such weapons since the resolution of this issue was conditional upon each side’s 
refusal to establish and develop a substantive anti-missile defense system. Moreover, 
the high command was still regretful about the delinking of INF and SDI.216   
Moiseyev did not refrain from directing his attacks at the Central Committee 
Plenum convened in early February 1990. This meeting marked a watershed in 
Soviet history since it signified the completion of the party’s renunciation of earlier 
monopoly and the creation of the new post of ‘presidency’ and a non-party 
‘Presidential Council.’217 The person to the new post was to be elected by universal 
suffrage, but Gorbachev’s election was an exception.218  Moiseyev was enraged on 
two grounds. Firstly, he was upset about the draft platform prepared and approved 
during the Plenum for the upcoming 28th Party Congress in July. In his view, the 
political leadership placed too much emphasis on curtailing the defense budget to the 
levels that would endanger Soviet military potential. Fearing lest this might deprive 
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the country of its combat capabilities and create an imbalance in strategic parity, the 
Chief of Staff demanded more concern on this touchy issue.219  
Next, he protested the new law on presidency, arguing that it was flawed on 
account of “serious defense-related omissions” in its formulation.220 To elaborate, the 
Chief of Staff pointed to the obscurity regarding the powers of the President and 
feared in case he attempted to abuse his “right personally to make the decision and 
issue authority to use nuclear weapons as a retaliatory measure.” Moiseyev’s 
apprehension was indicative of the high command’s absence during the law’s 
preparation. Another source of nuisance was the lack of clarification regarding the 
status of Defense Council in this new framework. Moiseyev averred that the role of 
the Defense Council in military matters should not be subsumed under the Supreme 
Soviet’s Committee for Defense and Security as well as the Presidential Council, 
since especially the latter included persons with insufficient background or authority 
on defense issues.221  
Meanwhile, the civilian leadership launched a counterattack. In April, 
Gorbachev stated firmly that it was imperative to “disarm and move to a peaceful 
track.” He argued that the Soviet Union took the lead among the states regarding 
defense spending since 18-20 percent of Soviet national revenue was earmarked for 
military purposes. Shevardnadze followed in, contending that, insistence on 
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“squandering” the national budget on defense expenditures would bring forth “a 
ruined country and an impoverished people [with] no need for an army.”222 
In the face of strenuous opposition by the civilian leadership, Yazov and 
Moiseyev did not backtrack. At the 28th CPSU Congress on July 2-13, 1990 Yazov 
went on with his derogatory remarks and contended that, curbing military spending 
at a moment when NATO’s doctrine, force structure and current programmes 
reflected the endurance of threat, amounted to gross irrationality.  Moiseyev 
concurred with the Defense Minister, drawing attention to the turmoil in Eastern 
Europe. He argued that, the Soviet Union was gradually forced into adopting an 
“unequivocal defensivism” based exclusively on Soviet territory.223 
It was not only Yazov and Moiseyev who articulated their displeasure for the 
civilian leadership. Party officials at every level, in particular the conservatives 
arguing the inefficiency of reforms, expressed their hostility toward Gorbachev. 
Fearing a demolition, Gorbachev withdrew his “500 Day Plan” -a comprehensive 
economic reform program- in October. Upon this move, Shevardnadze announced 
his resignation on December 20. Being the first of many prominent liberals to 
abandon Gorbachev, he heralded the nearing fall of the Soviet leader.224 
 
4.8. Concessions and socioeconomic crisis lead to coup 
 Against this backdrop, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 
was concluded in November 1990, after protracted negotiations dating back to March 
1989. Regarded as the most important arms control treaty signed in the post-war 
period, the treaty set forth a radical change in the balance of power in Europe 
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through establishing equal ceilings on major categories of equipment including tanks, 
artillery and personnel carriers. Most significantly, the Soviet Union and its allies 
were deprived of the ability to mount a credible surprise attack against NATO 
countries in Europe. Overall, the Warsaw Pact would have to destroy about 19.000 
tanks whereas for NATO, the required number corresponded to only about 4.000. 
The treaty required no substantial reductions in NATO’s armored troop carriers and 
no cuts in its artillery or combat aircraft whereas the reverse was valid for the Soviet 
case.225 
 Whether this treaty would contribute to a lessening of economic problems 
was the question of the day. When, on March 12-19, 1990, the 3rd Congress of the 
People’s Deputies abolished Article 6 of the Constitution, officially ending the 
monopoly of the CPSU, nobody could have anticipated the catastrophic 
consequences that would follow. As 1990 drew to an end, the negative developments 
across the country associated with the weakening of the Soviet political 
infrastructure, reductions in the authority of the central government, and incompetent 
management, were clearly visible. Deterioration of the work ethic and of 
bureaucratic discipline had reared its head as early as 1989, contributing to a decline 
in production levels. Disarray in the distribution of raw materials, mechanical 
supplies and food also added up to this dim picture. In 1990, the Soviet economy 
declined in absolute figures for the first time. Unabated inflation and the disastrous 
1990 harvest pointed to further deterioration. The economy’s poor performance 
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coupled with the newly emerging political parties set the stage for national 
disturbances and influential political opposition movements.226 
It was not only the civilian population that was smitten by the deepening 
crisis. Most army officers were critical about indifference and insensitivity to their 
basic needs such as housing. Their resentment against being elbowed out of power 
had long before reached a peak. Deprived of their social prestige and established 
privileges and struck with declining living standards, the military was gradually 
drawn into collaboration with the top echelons of the military-industrial complex as 
well as the politico-military bureaucracy of the state and the CPSU.227 
One consequence of decentralization of the defensemaking process was the 
advent of a host of new institutions and players. Legislators at both national and 
provincial levels assumed an increasing part in military decisions. Many republics 
sought greater role in designing defense programs.228 
The election of military members to the Congress of People’s Deputies and to 
the Supreme Soviet had legitimized their participation in politics. Uniformed 
personnel soon began to run for legislative and executive offices. For its part, the 
military leadership accented harsher appraisals of civilian policymaking. In 
December 1990, Moiseyev urged Gorbachev “to use his presidential powers to 
restore stability and halt republic separatism.”229 Yazov agreed with the Chief of 
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Staff on the need to establish order, yet he took one step further, hinting at the role of 
the army in politics, which could force the institution to “intervene” in domestic 
matters. As insurgency mounted to top in the Baltics in January 1991, Yazov raised 
his voice, stressing the military’s constitutional right to “defend the country’s 
territorial integrity.”230  
By spring, the revised Union Treaty denoted enhanced center-periphery 
collaboration. Much to the annoyance of the military, the Treaty endowed the 
republics with greater powers in the area of military policy.231 
Nevertheless, as military personnel became more ensnared in politics, sharp 
divisions within the officer corps rose to surface. Lamenting the diminution in 
numbers of Soviet weapons and the loss of Soviet dominance in East Europe, the 
senior military officers featured the conservative wing vis-à-vis junior and middle-
level officers who were very reform-minded. The former’s indignation grew as the 
START Treaty was finally materialized in July 1991.232 Its provisions mandated a 50 
percent reduction in the number of Soviet ICBMs and stipulated substantive cuts in 
the number of ballistic missile warheads, air-launched cruise missiles and bombs (25 
percent for the Soviet Union and 15 percent for the U.S.).233 
In view of these developments, an aggregate of military, party and state 
bureaucrats set up the Committee for the State of Emergency (SCSE) in August 1991 
and took up arms against the civilian leadership. The coup attempt was instigated not 
by the military, but by the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.234 The army 
halfheartedly partook in the planned undertaking, finally withdrawing its support 
from the initiative. Akhromeyev, who previously remarked that the military could 
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not even “entertain the thought of a coup,” and Yazov also contributed to the 
attempt, regretting their involvement in its aftermath. The coup began on August 19 
and lasted short, ending on the 22nd . Among the reasons for its collapse were the 
professional focus on external security threats, reluctance to engage in internal 
security missions, unfailing adherence to the Constitution by the junior officers, lack 
of logistical support and the resolve of Moscow citizens who vigorously defended 
the government and, thanks to the opportunity provided by the ‘new thinking’, 
demonstrated their discontent with the military establishment’s participation in the 
abortive coup.235 
The August coup revealed that almost three decades of efforts to instill into 
the officer corps the notions of i) abiding loyalty to the civilian authority, ii) 
institutional duty and mission, iii) intense professionalization had fared well. In 
supporting the SCSE, the top military brass did not attempt to take power into their 
own hands and establish their own rule. It was not the army to blame, but political, 
economic and social factors that led the military personnel follow the orders of the 
Committee. Feelings of anger and disappointment momentarily materialized into an 
unfortunate decision, which very quickly became a source of grief. This boomerang 
effect brought with it severe repercussions concerning the military establishment. 
After the coup, the CPSU structures and the politico-military agencies were 
removed. MPA, the main institution to oversee the military establishment was 
abolished, and a new directorate assumed its place.236 Many senior officers were 
removed from their positions whereas the ones who opposed the coup were promoted 
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to higher positions. Reform in the armed forces was accelerated. However, the 
imminent demise of the Soviet Union would hinder this project. A military reform 
document that reallocated the ruling of oversight and organizational restructuring 
could not be signed into law, leaving Russia and the other 14 former Soviet republics 
in a state of ambiguity.237  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 This thesis chronicled the ‘push and pull’ between the civilian and military 
leadership in order to prevail in Soviet defensemaking process. It narrated the 
magnitude and extent of political control over the high command, and the military’s 
disquietude over these constraints.  
 In the course of events, some similarities catch the eye characterizing each 
era under review. As was observed, every Soviet leader began his tenure with a 
propitiating stance toward the military apropos of the defense budget and relations 
with the West. Nevertheless, as domestic imperatives demanded a frugal utilization 
of resources, each withdrew their support. This shift in perspective displayed itself 
through various means: concessions during superpower negotiations, reductions in 
military expenditure and slow and incremental exclusion of the high command from 
the formulation of defense policies.  
 Differing in their assessment of threat, both institutions often failed to see eye 
to eye in policymaking. Whereas the civilian leadership placed a premium on 
economic revitalization (aimed at consumer satisfaction) through détente, the high 
command demanded constant vigilance against imperialist designs that would catch 
the country off-guard.  
The military leadership countered the civilian view with a mixture of replies. 
At times, they sought reconciliation with the civilian authority, agreeing to 
qualitative and quantitative reductions in weapons upon condition that the treaty 
provisions would not thoroughly enervate the Armed Forces’ capabilities. There 
were two motives behind this consent. Firstly, the endurance of détente would 
 74 
contribute to upgrading of Soviet military equipment in the form of easy access to 
advanced Western technology. Secondly, a strong economy, reached through 
cutbacks in defense expenditure, would later pay off as higher rates in military 
investment. Yet, most of the time, the high command openly articulated their 
indignation at what was called ‘subjectivism’ in defensemaking.  
Gradually, the military leadership understood that their established privileges 
were under close scrutiny and criticism. The army saw that it had long been 
condemned as the scapegoat, bearing the whole onus for the country’s accelerating 
pace toward political, economic and social turmoil –whereas the reverse case was 
true. It was the inept management of Soviet affairs by the civilian leadership that 
precipitated an irreversible decline. This realization caused great consternation in the 
military establishment. To add insult to injury, the reshuffling and disposal of 
military personnel and various alterations in the decisionmaking process sought to 
alienate the military further away from defense planning.  
Disjunction between the parties mounted during Gorbachev’s tenure when 
unilateral concessions ranked first in the policy agenda. He soon proved to be an all-
around revisionist, intending to distance himself from the foreign and military 
policies of his predecessors.  
Contrary to Brezhnev and Andropov, both of whom had refused to 
countenance any INF accord that would have crippled the Soviet Union’s theater 
nuclear advantage in Europe, Gorbachev proved to be more than willing to conclude 
such a deal so as to pave the way for agreement in other areas. Similarly, since 1981, 
the Soviet Union had vigorously countered the U.S. allegations arguing that the SS-
20s deployed in Soviet Europe were offensive weapons. According to the Soviet 
view, the deployment of several hundred SS-20 missiles between 1977 and 1984 was 
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a defensive measure, undertaken to ensure a stable balance of forces in Europe. 
Nevertheless, Gorbachev hastened to trade on these weapons, depriving the Soviet 
Armed Forces of a very powerful ballistic missile, the capabilities of which 
surpassed its U.S. counterparts. Soviet acceptance of mutual deterrence and 
renunciation of the goal of superiority had never been so clear-cut. For Brezhnev, 
class struggle was not over, but was to be continued by all means short of war. On 
the other and, Gorbachev de-emphasized the relevance of the international class 
struggle pointing to the need to engage in arms control and reduced defense 
spending. 
Ironically, the ultimate aim of the civilian leadership, namely, to arrest the 
drastic deterioration of the economy and to stabilize the political arena failed. As 
Gorbachev’s tenure drew to a close in 1991, the Soviet Union was still in search of a 
panacea –that would never come. The military’s participation in the abortive August 
coup marked a watershed in civil-military relations. Although the high command’s 
willingness to partake in the attempt was shrouded in ambivalence, it sounded as if 
the decades long political control over the military establishment had amounted to 
disobedience rather than loyalty. In effect, the armed forces’ withdrawal of support 
from the coup featured the apolitical nature of the military. 
So far, it was highly acknowledged that civil-military accommodation had 
been a thorny issue and a hard task to materialize. Yet, very few could have 
anticipated that the Soviet army would turn its back against the civilian authority. 
The coup was the harbinger of severe repercussions affecting the civilian and 
military leaderships alike. It catalyzed a more comprehensive restructuring of the 
military establishment and, most significantly, the demise of the Soviet Union.  
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